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The Role of EU and NATO Conditionality on Developing Democracies: A Georgian Case Study 
 
Carolyn A. De Roster 
 
 
Abstract: This thesis evaluates the effect of EU and NATO conditionality on institutional change 
in the Republic of Georgia. It hypothesizes that as developing democracies undergo prolonged 
accession processes with the EU and/or NATO, citizens are more likely to become disillusioned 
with the accession process. Disillusionment among citizens allows for the election anti-Western, 
non-democratic candidates and political parties to power, who, once elected, are able to institute 
non-democratic reforms that reverse institutional democratization. This thesis tests this theory 
using a mixed qualitative and qualitative analysis of Georgia, and draws parallels with the theory-
building case of Turkey. Overall, the thesis finds preliminary support for the proposed theory in 
Georgian public opinion surveys, Georgian parliamentary party representation, and comparisons 
of institutional change in Georgia and Turkey. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 The Republic of Georgia has had a relatively short, but critical democratic history. The 
Rose Revolution in 2003 helped transform Georgia into a democracy, and since then, Georgia has 
built relationships with the EU and NATO in hopes of deepening its relations with the West. These 
relationships with the West have in part shaped Georgia’s foreign and domestic policy, as it seeks 
EU and NATO membership. It is in this context that this paper examines the role of EU and NATO 
conditionality on developing democracies, using Georgia as the primary case study. 
 
The Rose Revolution and Georgia’s Democratic History 
 Georgia’s prospects for democracy followed the Rose Revolution. Prior to the Rose 
Revolution, Georgia was neither democratic, nor was it a classical dictatorship. Rather, it was a 
mixed regime with democratic and authoritarian elements. Georgia’s combination of democratic 
and authoritarian elements created internal political dynamics that allowed for a democratic 
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revolution in 2003.1 Georgia’s shift towards its present democratic system was the product of a 
revolution, not a transition. Where both a democratic revolution and democratic transition refer to 
distinct changes in political regime from non-democratic to more democratic, a revolution involves 
a bottom-up process, while a transition typically involves bargaining among elites.2 
 Under Shevardnadze, Georgia officially recognized democracy in its constitutional 
framework. The constitution outlined an independent parliament from the executive branch, the 
freedom of political parties, and the right of media and civil society organization to be active in 
the political process. However, Shevardnadze and other elites assumed that there were still enough 
measures that could be used to prevent a change of government through elections, thus ensuring 
the continuity of Shevardnadze’s rule.3 Ultimately, Shevardnadze’s government was a managed 
democracy in which the leadership tolerated pluralism, but in a limited form. The system allowed 
for a number of interests to be represented, but ensured that key decisions were made by a small 
group of elites.4  
 Despite Shevardnadze’s assumption that his managed democracy would ensure his power, 
there were enough democratic freedoms to engage citizens and allow alternative political actors to 
mobilize public support against the regime. When the government sought to take away power from 
independent political actors, protests began to emerge. These actions served as a precursor to the 
Rose Revolution.5 
                                                          
1 Nodia, “The Dynamics and Sustainability of the Rose Revolution,” Democratisation in the European 
Neighbourhood, ed. Michael Emerson (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005): 38.  
2 Ibid, 40.  
3 Ibid, 42.  
4 Ibid, 42. 
5 For example, Shevardnadze tried to limit Georgia’s most popular television outlet, Rustavi-2, by sending in 
security forces. Popular backlash to the raid led to mass protests that forced Shevardnadze’s cabinet to resign.  
Ibid, 43. 
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 In November 2003, thousands of protestors demonstrated in Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi, 
demanding free and fair elections. The protests came in response to Shevardnadze’s attempt to seat 
an illegally elected parliament.6  The Rose Revolution was able to happen because of a few key 
forces that existed in the pre-Revolution environment. First, civil society organizations were 
already active and had an impact on government and society by the time the parliamentary 
elections occurred. Second, Georgia had a free and independent media. The media, with the help 
of NGOs, had become powerful enough by 2003 that it was able to help initiate, cover, and 
maintain public support for the Rose Revolution. Third, state authority under Shevardnadze was 
waning leading up to the revolution, and Georgia was verging on become a fragile if not failing 
state. Lastly, Georgian national identity allowed for citizens to unite under a single cause during 
the revolution. The unity of the revolution provided the organizational capacity for it to ultimately 
be successful.7  
 Mikheil Saakashvili led the Rose Revolution, paving the way for him to become Georgia’s 
president following the movement.8 Despite Saakashvili’s association with the democratic Rose 
Revolution, his government was highly criticized. Following the revolution, Saakashvili changed 
Georgia’s system from a separation of powers to a presidential system with a weak parliament in 
the constitution. Such a system is common in semi-authoritarian post-Soviet regimes, and 
generally limits democratic development. 9  Not only did these changes to the constitution 
consolidate power under the president, but they were also rushed through parliament within two 
weeks of Saakashvili taking office, leaving little time for a debate in the public.10 Saakashvili’s 
                                                          
6 Lincoln A. Mitchell, “Democracy in Georgia Since the Rose Revolution,” East European Democratization, (Fall 
2006): 669. 
7 James V. Wertsch, “Georgia as a Laboratory for Democracy,” Demokratizatsiya, (2006): 520-521.  
8 Mitchell, 669.  
9 Nodia, 44. 
10 Mitchell, 672.  
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government also did not distinguish between the ruling party, the United National Movement 
(UNM), and the government itself. The lack of a distinction left a sense that support for the ruling 
party was a prerequisite for any political position in Georgia.11 Other criticisms of Saakashvili’s 
government include the fact that judges rarely contradicted prosecutors, the opposition became 
extremely weak, the media became less independent, and NGOs became less assertive. Often, 
Saakashvili justified these actions as a means of fighting corruption.12 
 At the time, it appeared that Saakashvili’s government consisted of demagogues who were 
able to use popular discontent against Shevardnadze as a means of securing their own power. 
Furthermore, Saakashvili’s government appeared to learn from Shevardnadze’s mistake of 
allowing democratic freedoms. The new government realized the danger that democratic freedoms 
posed to the stability of the ruling class.13 Other assessments concluded that the Rose Revolution 
was part of a cycle of non-constitutional transfer of power in Georgia. At the time, it seemed that 
Georgia was becoming a state in which every leader would become accused of authoritarianism, 
which would lead to a revolution, and the rise of a new leader who would recreate a similar 
authoritarian system in their own style.14 
 Ultimately, Saakashvili’s government is recognized for its ability to engage in state-
building in Georgia.15 The prior government, under Shevardnadze, presided over a weak state in 
with there was limited state authority and questionable territorial integrity.16 Under Saakashvili, 
however, the government was able to incorporate the Adjara region into Georgia’s official territory. 
                                                          
11 Ibid.  672-673. 
12 Nodia, 44. 
13 Ibid, 44-45. 
14 Ibid, 45. 
15 Ibid, 47. 
16 Though Shevardnadze’s government could be considered more democratic, it is not possible for democratic 
institutions to exist without a functional state and some basic consensus as to whose state it is. 
Ibid, 46. 
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Additionally, the government was able to drastically increase public revenues, begin paying 
salaries to public servants, manage corruption in the police force, and launch public infrastructure 
projects. Collectively, these initiatives laid the foundations for the modern Georgian state.17 
 Regardless of the flaws of the Saakashvili government, Georgia’s leadership under 
Saakashvili was strongly pro-Western after the Rose Revolution. 18  Saakashvili himself was 
educated in the United States, and many cabinet members, members of parliament, and key 
political leaders were at least partially educated in the West.19 Some of these Western-educated 
leaders had return to Georgia from the West specifically to aid the state reconstruction process 
once Saakashvili had become president.20  
 Though Saakashvili had largely consolidated power in the executive branch, thereby 
creating more of a presidential rather than democratic system, the October 2012 parliamentary 
elections brought an opposition collation, the Georgian Dream, into power. Later, when the 
candidate for the Georgian Dream party, Georgy Margvelashvili, won the presidential election in 
2013, there was a peaceful transfer of power from Saakashvili’s UNM party to the Georgian Dream 
party for the first time in Georgia’s modern history. 21  The peaceful transfer of power from 
Saakashvili to Margvelashvili was also accompanied by a return to the parliamentary system, in 
which power would shift away from the president towards the prime minister. The successful 
                                                          
17 Ibid, 47. 
18 During the Rose Revolution itself many Georgian citizens waved American flags as they called for the resignation 
of Shevardnadze. Following the resignation of Shevardnadze, a billboard was put in Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi, with 
the words “Thank you U.S.A.” on it. Georgians largely see democracy as a Western idea, but unlike many countries, 
Georgia does not have a negative perception of the West or democracy. There is little ideological competition to 
Western democracy in Georgia, and there is little nostalgia for the Soviet Union as there is in other post-Soviet 
republics.  
Mitchell, 671. 
19 Saakashvili was a Muskie Fellow at Columbia University. 
Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 “Georgia’s Election: The End of Saakashvili’s Reign,” The Economist, 2 November 2013 
<http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21588949-georgia-elects-new-less-powerful-president-end-saakashvilis-
reign> (accessed 13 February 2017).  
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transfer of power ultimately represented the transformation of Georgia into a young, but 
functioning democracy.22  
 Under Georgia’s democratic system, the new generation of Georgians are more 
Westernized and more confident about Westernizing the country. This generation believes that 
Georgia is an inherently Western country, and that the country should be modernized to meet at 
least the standards of Westernization of Central and Eastern European post-communist countries.23   
 
Georgia’s Relationship to Western Institutions 
 Georgia has been seeking North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership as well 
as increased cooperation with the European Union (EU) since gaining independence from the 
Soviet Union. With regards to NATO, Georgia has taken a number of steps to increase its 
cooperation. Beginning, in 1992, Georgia became a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC). Two years later, Georgia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), and 
engaged in numerous NATO programs, which culminated in the launch of high-level regular 
political consultations with the NATO International Agency in 2001. In 2002, Georgia formally 
announced its aspirations to join NATO.24   
 In 2009, Georgia was integrated in the European Eastern Partnership (EaP), a section of 
the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).25  The ENP, and by extension the EaP, were 
developed as an alternative strategy to European enlargement, as a way to build good relationships 
                                                          
22 Ibid. 
23 Nodia, 49-50. 
24 Maia Edilashvili, “Washington’s Changed Tone and Georgia’s NATO Hopes,” Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review 
23, (2010): 57-59. 
25 The EaP focused specifically on six states total: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.  
Daniel Silander and Martin Nilsson, “Democratization Without Enlargement? The European Neighbourhood Policy 
on Post-Communist Transitions,” Contemporary Politics 19, no. 4 (2013): 441. 
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with neighboring European states. Through building relationships with neighboring states, the EaP 
sought to advance democracy in partner states, thus having a positive effect on the EU.26 
 Since the launch of the ENP, however, there have been few signs of democratic progress 
in the electoral processes, national democratic governance, the media, the judicial framework, and 
on corruption in ENP states. Some states have even shown a reverse democratic transition rather 
than democratization.27 Ultimately, since gaining independence from the Soviet Union, Georgia 
has advanced its cooperation with both NATO and the EU, but progress towards complete 
democratic consolidation has been limited.  
 Since the Rose Revolution, Georgia has continued to make democratic reforms, but 
democracy-related issues such as building democratic institutions, ensuring government 
accountability, and cultivating a strong civil society have been met with a mixed track record.28 
Often, Georgia’s modernization has involved changing external features of national governmental, 
but avoiding the need for deeper institutional reforms. This pattern of external modernization 
allows practices such as informal decision making and fluid leadership roles among elites to 
continue.29 Thus, there are still many facets of democracy that need to be developed in Georgia’s 
democratization process. 
 
Studying Institutional Change in Georgia 
This paper seeks to investigate the effect of the EU and NATO accession processes on 
institutional change in developing democracies, using the Republic of Georgia as a real-time case 
                                                          
26 Ibid. 
27 Nations in Transit analysis for five ENP states in the east suggests that democratic progress has halted or reversed 
since introduction into the ENP.  
Ibid, 448-449. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Shalva Dzebisashvili, “Conditionality and Compliance: The Shaky Dimensions of NATO Influence (The 
Georgian Case),” The Quarterly Journal, (Spring 2014): 21.  
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study. Georgia serves as an excellent case study, as it is a developing democracy seeking both EU 
and NATO membership. Due to Georgia’s potential to change its currently friendly position 
towards the West, such a study is useful in examining the future tendencies of both post-Soviet 
states and developing democracies as a whole.  
This paper is separated into seven sections. The first section examines the existing literature 
on the topic of EU and NATO conditionality and its effect on institutional change. The second 
section of the paper examines existing theories of institutional change, and proposes an alternative 
theory based on perceived gaps in the literature. The third section outlines a theory-building case, 
Turkey, which serves as an example of a developing democracy that is in a similar position to 
Georgia, but that is further along its accession process. The fourth section presents three 
hypotheses that this study tests regarding the effect of the EU and NATO accession processes on 
institutional change in Georgia. The fifth section outlines the methodology and research design of 
the study. The sixth section provides a mixed qualitative and quantitative approach to analyzing 
the Georgian case. This section is separated into three parts, each of which present evidence to 
support the proposed alternative theory. The final section is the conclusion, and summarizes the 
study, provides implications of the results, and outlines potential areas for further research.  
 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
Existing literature on the role of the EU and NATO accession process in institutional 
change in developing democracies can be divided into three main arguments. First, there are 
cultural explanations that argue that the pre-existing culture of a potential member state affects 
whether or not the state will institute reforms necessary for accession. Second, there are 
institutional explanations that describe how historical legacies shape institutions that predispose 
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candidate states to either institute or fail to institute democratic reforms. Lastly, there are credibility 
explanations that argue the perceived credibility of an accession offer affects whether or not a 
given candidate state will fully pursue the democratic reforms necessary for accession.  
 
The Role of Culture 
 Under the literature covering cultural explanations for the success or failure of political 
conditionality, the general argument is that countries with more favorable, or similar, cultures to 
that of the West are more likely to institute democratic reforms in response to the EU and NATO 
accession processes.30 Literature surrounding the idea of culture as a factor in the success of 
democratic institutional change largely focuses on comparing the case of Turkey in its quest for 
EU accession against the case of the EU’s expansion into Eastern Europe. The former is considered 
a failure in institutional change, while the latter has largely been considered a success. 
 Turkey has been officially recognized as a viable EU candidate since 1999, and a 
negotiating country since 2005. Prior to being recognized as a viable candidate, Turkey awaited 
recognition since applying to the EU in 1962.31 Despite transformations in politics, economics, 
and foreign policy, negotiations have stalled, and Turkey continues to be a candidate country due 
to shortcomings in fulfilling the necessary political criteria regarding the stability of institutions 
that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect and protection of minorities, 
each of which lie at the core of the EU.32 It has been observed that Turkey’s ruling party, the AKP, 
has been reluctant to enact necessary reform packages. A key perspective on this issue is the idea 
                                                          
30 Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholtz, “Legacies and Leverage: EU Political Conditionality and Democracy 
Promotion in Historical Perspective,” Europe-Asia Studies 62, no. 3 (May 2010): 457-458. 
31 Michael Emerson, Senem Aydin, Gergana Noutcheva, Nathalie Tocci, Marius Vahl, and Richard Youngs, “The 
Reluctant Debutante: The EU as a Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood,” Democratisation in the European 
Neighbourhood, ed. Michael Emerson (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005): 186-187. 
32 Sinem Akgul Acikmese, “EU Conditionality and Desecuritization Nexus in Turkey,” Southeast European and 
Black Sea Studies 13, no. 3 (2013): 311-312, 
Emerson et. al., 186-187. 
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that Turkey’s religious and cultural traditions are fundamentally different from “European values” 
and secular liberals.33 Furthermore, there is a shared wisdom that the main reason for European 
objections to Turkish entry into the EU are Turkey’s cultural and religious differences from 
Europe.34 
 In contrast, some scholars consider Eastern enlargement of the EU as one of the EU’s 
greatest foreign policy successes. The “Europeanization” of Eastern Europe involved the transfer 
for EU norms and rules to candidate countries in Central and Eastern European post-communist 
countries.35 Europeanization includes, in addition to democratization, the convergence of modern 
European norms and values through the interaction of the legally binding norms of the EU for 
democracy and human rights, the transformation of interests of enterprises and individuals as a 
result of increasing integration, and the transformation of values and identities in society.36 To an 
extent, Europeanization overlaps with democratization, as Europeanization is generally perceived 
as the penetration of the EU into national politics and decision-making.37 The success of the EU’s 
enlargement into Eastern and Central Europe is largely attributed to the demand for EU 
membership in these European countries. Because Eastern and Central European countries were 
seen as initially more European, the national political leaders had greater incentives to push for 
reforms that would align with the EU’s requirements for institutional change.38 
                                                          
33 Ali Rahigh-Aghsan, “Turkey’s EU Quest and Political Cleavages under AKP,” Canadian Center of Science and 
Education 3, no. 1 (June 2011): 48-49. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Arista Maria Cirtautas and Frank Schimmelfennig, “Europeanisation Before and After Accession: Conditionality, 
Legacies, and Compliance,” Europe-Asia Studies 62, no. 3 (2010): 422. 
36 Emerson et. al., 175. 
37 Alina Mungiu-Pippidy, “EU Enlargement and Democracy Progress,” Democratisation in the European 
Neighbourhood, ed. Michael Emerson (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005): 16. 
38 Bernard Steunenberg and Antoaneta Dimitrova, “Compliance in the EU Enlargement Process: The Limits of 
Conditionality,” European Integration online Papers 11 (2007): 2-3. 
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 Ultimately, the role of culture in determining the success of Western political conditionality 
is tied to the idea that states more culturally similar to Western institutions are more likely to result 
in more successful accession processes and accompanying institutional change.  
 
The Role of Institutional and Historical Legacies   
 A number of authors have produced important literature regarding the effect of institutional 
legacies on the success of the EU accession process in shaping institutional change. While 
underlying cultural dispositions play a role in democratization prospects, the effectiveness of 
Western political conditionality is also dependent on institutional and historical legacies. 39 
Legacies are broadly defined as “the inherited aspects of the past relevant to the present.”40 
Ultimately, these historical legacies have an impact on present political institutions and attitudes 
that in turn affect a candidate state’s level of democratic development.41  
 Some authors find that “EU political conditionality is highly relevant and effective under 
two conditions: (1) that the target countries obtained a membership perspective, and (2) that they 
had developed into hybrid regimes or illiberal democracies in the transition between autocracy and 
democracy”.42  Under  this view, it is assumed that the historical legacy of Western civilization 
makes it easier for the EU to succeed in offering membership, as such candidate states are already 
more closely European.   
Thus, to the extent that some states have historical and/or institutional legacies that are 
more closely tied to democracy, it may be easier for these states to transition to a more democratic 
system. This transition to democratic institutions is seen as easier in states that have more Western 
                                                          
39 Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 444.  
40 Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig, 426. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 457. 
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historical and institutional legacies because democratic values and practices are more deeply 
entrenched in the government and society.  
 
The Role of Western Credibility 
 The perceived credibility of an offer to join Western institutions shapes a candidate 
country’s perceptions of whether or not reforms are worth the expected benefits of membership. 
When accession negotiations between the EU and the candidate country begin, there is an 
expectation that the applicant country will, at some unknown point in time, be able to receive 
membership status once it has fulfilled the necessary conditions for membership. Under such a 
system, the perceived benefits of membership must not only be sufficiently enticing, but elites 
must be credibly convinced that at some point in time the country will join the Union; otherwise, 
there are few incentives to continue with domestic political changes.43  
 Prior studies have found that the credible prospect of accession to the EU after the 
institution of democratic reforms has been the most effective of the EU’s strategies.44 Both the size 
and the credibility of tangible, material incentives that the EU provides contribute to the success 
of institutional change through the accession process.45 While it is highly beneficial if there are 
favorable political conditions in the candidate country, credibility of accession post-reformation 
remains the foundation for an EU offer of accession.46  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43 Steunenberg and Dimitrova, 3. 
44 Schimmelfennig and Scholtz,443.  
45 Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig, 426., 422. 
46 Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 443. 
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Theory of Institutional Change 
 
 Existing theories regarding the impact of the EU and NATO on institutional change focus 
on the ability of the EU and NATO to appeal to prospective countries due to the attractiveness of 
the benefits that come with EU and/or NATO membership. There are additional theories and 
studies that examine the differences between EU and NATO conditionality, means through which 
the EU and NATO effect change in developing democracies outside of the formal accession 
process, and the successes and failures of each Western organization in effecting institutional 
change. This study summarizes these existing theories, but ultimately proposes an alternative 
theory of institutional change. The alternative theory proposed is based on the idea of “accession 
fatigue,” and the theory outlines how accession fatigue may lead to a reversal of pro-democratic 
institutional change. 
 
Existing Theory of Institutional Change 
 
 The EU and NATO both use a system of political conditionality to affect positive 
democratic change in developing democracies. Under the principle of political conditionality, 
institutions such as the EU and NATO offer candidate states the prospect of membership in return 
for domestic reforms. The success of political conditionality operates under the strategy of 
“reinforcement by reward,” in which the financial assistance, institutional association, and/or 
membership is anticipated to provide economic and political benefits that exceed the costs of 
making domestic reforms.47  
                                                          
47 Steunenberg and Dimitrova, 4; 
Rainer Schweickert, Inna Melnykovska, Ansgar Belke, and Ingo Bordon, “Prospective NATO or EU Membership 
and Institutional Change in Transition Countries,” Economics of Transition 19, no. 4 (2011): 669. 
Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 443. 
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Such a process of institutional influence can be divided into two phases. In the first phase, 
international institutions convince elite reformers in developing democracies of the desirability 
and credibility of accession.48 Socialization implies that institutions do not use a forceful policy, 
but instead engage neighbors through personal and institutional contacts and joint activities.49 In 
the second phase, the institution empowers domestic reformers to overcome opposition forces 
through the provision of rewards for compliance.50 The conditionality process implies that the 
institution provides economic, political, and/or strategic incentives on the condition that political 
and economic objectives are met.51 Taken collectively, these two phases can be considered as a 
mix of socializing and conditional forces that work together to stimulate institutional change in 
developing democracies. 52  While both the EU and NATO use the same underlying idea of 
“reinforcement by reward” to gain institutional influence, the EU and NATO focus on different 
incentives to drive changes.  
 
European Union Conditionality and Institutional Change 
 
For the EU, the reward of the Common Market, which is intrinsically tied the EU’s shared 
values of democracy and human rights, rule of law, governance, collective security, market 
economy principles, and sustainable development, maximizes institutional influence over 
domestic reforms.53 The EU’s set of norms, values, and institutions is connected not only to the 
                                                          
48 Rachel A. Epstein, “NATO Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidence and Expectations,” Security 
Studies 14, no. 1 (2005): 68; 
Emerson et. al.,  175. 
49 Pippidy, “EU Enlargement and Democracy Progress,” 17; 
Emerson et. al.,  175. 
50 Epstein, 68; 
Emerson et. al.,  175. 
51 Pippidy, “EU Enlargement and Democracy Progress,” 17; 
Emerson et. al.,  175. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Silander and Nilsson, 447. 
“The EU's single market is the largest in the world, serving 500 million citizens and generating 23% of world GDP.” 
15 
 
idea of democratization, but also “Europeanization”. While democratization and Europeanization 
are overlapping categories, they are not synonymous. 54  Democratization and political 
transformation are part of a process in which countries must achieve free elections to be considered 
generally democratic, but generally require additional changes to be considered fully-fledge liberal 
democracies. Such improvements include the expansion of civil liberties, the rule of law, 
independent judiciaries, accountable institutions, a pluralistic civil society, and civilian control 
over the military.55 Europeanization embraces democratization, but also includes the norms and 
values pertaining to the rule of law and human rights that are commonly seen throughout Europe.56  
The Copenhagen Criteria for accession to the EU demand the fulfillment of political, legal, 
and economic demands, with democracy and the rule of law being considered paramount.57 The 
EU specifies that “membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection 
of minorities”.58 Additionally, applicant countries must accept all treaties, valid EU legislation, 
EU Court verdicts, and “soft law,” also known as the acquis communautaire, in full.59 Countries 
are invited to join once they have certifiably fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria.60 New members 
                                                          
“EU Enlargement Strategy,” European Commission, 11 October 2015, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_strategy_paper_en.pdf> (accessed 2 October 
2016); 
Pippidy, “EU Enlargement and Democracy Progress,” 15. 
The desirability of EU membership has been reinforced by the success of EU enlargement to the East that has been 
credited with making a significant contribution to economic recovery, peace and stability, and democratization 
throughout post-Soviet Eastern and Central Europe. 
Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 443. 
54 Emerson et. al., 169. 
55 Pippidy, “EU Enlargement and Democracy Progress,” 16. 
56 Emerson et. al., 174-175. 
57 Schweickert, et. al., 668; 
Emerson et. al., 214. 
58 European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993, SN 180/1/93, 
REV1, 1993 < file:///C:/Users/Jessica/Downloads/72921.pdf> (accessed 2 October 2016). 
59 Pipiddy, “EU Enlargement and Democracy Progress,” 18. 
60 Ibid, 16. 
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are integrated in the EU’s institutional framework on a basis of limited adaptation, with the promise 
of a fundamental review following enlargement. 61  The EU accession process has fostered 
institution building in Eastern and Central European states seeking EU membership by delivering 
political incentives for elites, fostering shifts in the domestic balance of power, and adopting better 
democratic governance.62 Studies regarding the rapid accession of Eastern European countries to 
the EU in 2004 and 2007 exemplify the EU’s position as an attractive center of democracy, able 
to influence the domestic politics of other states.63  
Asymmetric bargaining power further aides the EU conditionality process. Enlargement of 
the EU rests on converging interests between existing and potential members. Existing member 
states promote accession because they foresee long-term economic and geopolitical benefits from 
accession such as the expansion of commercial activities and the stabilization of neighboring 
countries. Potential EU member states participate in the accession process because they seek the 
benefits of the EU’s Common Market, inclusion into Western institutions, and the stabilization of 
their democratic and capitalist systems. The benefits of EU membership are magnified when these 
potential states consider the “costs of exclusion” from the Common Market and Western 
institutions. Thus, countries seeking accession into the EU are in a weaker bargaining position. 
While both the existing EU member states and the candidate states will benefit from enlargement, 
the candidate states will benefit more from membership. Because of these asymmetric bargaining 
conditions, candidate states must make concessions in order to achieve membership status.64  
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Collectively, EU ideas of democratization and Europeanization, the Copenhagen Criteria, 
and asymmetric bargaining demonstrate how the EU promotes democracy through a combination 
of social power, political conditionality, and significant political and economic incentives. While 
Georgia has not achieved official negotiating status with the EU, the Georgian government has 
explicitly made Euro-Atlantic integration the country’s top foreign policy priority, as outlined in 
Georgia’s Government Communication Strategy on Georgia's Membership to the EU and NATO 
for 2017 to 2020. The Communication Strategy outlines a series of steps that the government seeks 
to take in order to maximize support for Georgia’s integration with the EU and NATO both among 
its domestic population and its international partners.65 The fact that Georgia has passed such a 
document that outlines the government’s clear intentions to join the EU and NATO is critical in 
applying the logic of the EU accession process to Georgia. Since Georgia has an official 
government position that asserts Georgia’s intentions to join the EU, it can be argued that the logic 
of the EU conditionality and accession process may be applied to Georgia’s process of institutional 
change. Thus, going forward, it is likely that Georgia will likely try and adapt to the EU, regardless 
of whether or not the EU officially recognizes Georgia as a candidate state. 
 
European Union External Governance 
The EU further practices institutional influence through external governance.66 External 
governance occurs when parts of the acquis communautaire are extended to non-member states.67 
The EU’s accession process and external governance initiatives all share the same foundations 
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regarding EU norms, values, and standards, but each varies in the intensity of their conditionality 
and incentives for compliance.68 However, EU enlargement will likely cease to be the EU’s 
primary form of effecting institutional change. First, the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargement have 
decreased the number of potential new member states. Second, the large size of the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements triggered internal EU debates regarding the new member states’ fitness for 
membership. Third, remaining candidate states face significant challenges in meeting the 
necessary conditions for accession. Lastly, some countries, such as Norway and Switzerland, meet 
the EU accession criteria but face domestic opposition to joining the EU. Thus, EU enlargement 
will likely become a less prominent mechanism of institutional change, and external governance 
will take precedence.69 
EU external governance takes three main forms – hierarchy, networks, and the market. 
Hierarchical governance uses formalized relationships to create enforceable rules. The EU uses 
quasi-hierarchical systems to influence non-member states, as it cannot have a fully hierarchical 
effect on states outside the Union. These quasi-hierarchical forms include the European Economic 
Area (EEA) and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), as both include rules, formal 
procedures, and monitoring mechanisms that are characteristic of a hierarchical system. 70  A 
network system includes relationships in which actors are relatively equal and use mutual 
agreements to achieve policy solutions. In the EU, networks are successful in providing influence 
through socialization and communication.71 The market is another form of external governance in 
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which there is networked co-ordination through the EU’s Single Market. The influence of the 
market has been extended to non-member states through the EEA and its full transfer of Single 
Market legislation.72  The differing forms of EU external governance allow the EU to influence 
non-member states to introduce institutional change as they require adherence to specific rules in 
hierarchical systems, socialize non-member states in network systems, and ensure firms interested 
in operating within the EU adhere to EU rules.73 Collectively these mechanisms allow the EU to 
provide a model for other states who may perceive EU institutions as the appropriate solution for 
their own problems.74  
Due to the EU’s external governance, EU rules and custom still influence Georgia, andcan 
have an effect on institutional change. A significant example of EU external governance on 
Georgia has been the institution of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalization (VLAP) between the 
EU and Georgia. The VLAP proposed visa-free travel for short stays in the EU for Georgian 
nationals holding biometric passports provided the government meet key VLAP benchmarks. The 
VLAP has four key benchmarks: document security; migration and integrated border management; 
public order and security; and external relations and fundamental rights.75 The combination of 
these VLAP requirements is a part of the EU’s external governance through a hierarchical system 
that includes rules and monitoring to ensure the completion of visa liberalization. Georgia received 
visa liberalization through the VLAP process in 2016.76 Thus, it can be argued that the logic of EU 
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external governance can be applied to Georgia regardless of Georgia’s lack of an official 
negotiating country status with the EU.  
 
NATO Conditionality and Institutional Change 
NATO’s institutional influence comes from the promise of security and stability that 
members receive from Article V of the Alliance. Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates 
that an attack on one member state is an attack on all member states. When Article V is triggered, 
NATO responds with collective military force. The promise of a collective NATO response thus 
serves as a deterrent against powers who may seek to invade NATO member states.77 The appeal 
of NATO’s collective security promise is particularly enticing to states who feel vulnerable to 
larger powers. In order to join NATO, however, states must meet basic requirements of democracy 
in their state electoral laws, constitution, and election monitoring; states must also have civilian 
control over the military, which is assumed to support democratic rule.78 Furthermore, states who 
fail to remain democratic after joining NATO risk losing their signatory status of the North Atlantic 
Treaty. The potential loss of Article 5 protections incentivizes states to remain democratic 
following accession.79  
The spread and defense of democracy has been one of the four key principles of NATO 
and its enlargement policy. The spread of democracy in the context of NATO offers additional 
benefits such as higher levels of trade, a reduced probability of violence, and a reduced likelihood 
of domestic human rights abuses. There are three main mechanisms through which NATO spreads 
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democracy. First, NATO requires that states make democratic reforms for membership. The 
adoption of these reforms is verified through the inspection of a state’s electoral laws, constitution, 
and electoral process. Second, NATO membership can be used to ensure new members remain 
democratic, as any member that reverts to authoritarian rule may be ejected from the alliance. 
Third, NATO membership could nurture democracy though the development of civil-military 
relations. A potential threat to democracy is military intervention in domestic politics, specifically 
through coup d’états. Developing civil-military relations ensures civil supremacy over the military, 
thus reducing potential risks to democracy.80 The requirements of NATO for states to institute 
democratic reforms, to remain democratic once accepted, and to ensure civil-military relations 
creates a form of conditionality that incites institutional change in candidate and member states 
alike.  
            Georgia has a particularly vested interested in becoming a member of NATO due to its 
prior history of war with Russia in 2008. In 2008, Russian invaded the Georgian territories of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in response to the pro-Western policies of then-president Mikheil 
Saakashvili. 81  Abkhazia and South Ossetia are now Russian-occupied frozen conflicts. 82  If 
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Georgia were included in NATO, Article V of the Alliance would be triggered in the case of a 
future Russian invasion, which would protect Georgia against its major international security threat. 
Thus, for Georgia, NATO membership is a key foreign policy objective.83 Furthermore, Georgia 
has already contributed more to NATO military operations than most long-time Alliance members 
and met general requirements that would be included in a Membership Action Plan, such as a 
functioning democratic system of government, an open society, and a market-based economy. 
Collectively, these measures demonstrate Georgia’s commitment to NATO, despite not formally 
being a part of the Alliance.84 At the same time, however, Georgia represents a liability to NATO. 
Russia perceives NATO as a direct counter to Russia’s military and Russian interests. Thus, 
expanding NATO into a former Soviet Republic such as Georgia could provoke Russia, forcing 
NATO to trigger Article V.85 Regardless, Georgia’s strong security-driven desire to join NATO 
supports the fact that NATO conditionality applies to Georgia’s process of institutional change.  
Furthermore, Georgia’s existing steps towards making institutional changes consistent with NATO 
requirements provides further evidence for the fact that NATO conditionality can influence 
Georgia’s process of institutional change. 
Both the EU and NATO thus offer significant benefits to membership in exchange for 
domestic reforms. In the former, the benefits are largely economic, while in the latter the benefits 
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are largely militarily and strategic. While these benefits to and incentives for membership differ, 
the idea of using benefits as a reward in exchange for reform is a common means of fostering 
institutional change in both the EU and NATO. Because there is some cooperation between the 
EU and NATO regarding membership, resulting economic and security-related benefits increase 
the benefits of institutional reforms for potential candidate states of both organizations.86 In the 
case of Georgia, there are a number of factors that suggest Georgia would adhere to EU and NATO 
conditionality processes, despite not currently undergoing a formal accession process. 
 
The Successes and Failures of EU and NATO Conditionality 
The enlargement process of the EU has been considered strong in its legal and institutional 
capacity, whereas the EU’s EEA and ENP demonstrate a set of divergent preferences, ambiguities, 
and institutional cleavages.87 While the ENP invites interested states to converge on EU norms, 
values, and standards, it fails to specify the meaning of its ideals. In response, many neighboring 
states have declared their long-term ambitions to join the EU, despite a lack of acknowledgement 
from the EU that these ambitions will be recognized. Beyond a lack of acknowledgement, there is 
evidence of growing resistance to EU enlargement among current EU members.88 Some existing 
EU member states have seen a decline in the popularity of enlargement among voters. Voters 
against additional enlargement associate the addition of new member states with rising illegal 
immigration, international crime, and unemployment.89 At the same time, applicant countries who 
have continuously received criticisms from the EU are facing a rise in Euroscepticism from their 
domestic populations. While these applicant countries have already made reforms, they must make 
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additional concessions to enter the final phase of negotiations. These potential member states are 
faced with increasing pressures from the population against making these final concessions.90 
Ultimately, the domestic power of candidate governments and their ability to influence policies 
determine the effectiveness of conditionality.91 
            Studies regarding the EU and NATO accession processes demonstrate that the institutional 
changes in new member states are not deeply entrenched. 92  In some cases this leads to the 
phenomenon of European “backsliding” in which states, once achieving EU and/or NATO 
membership, regress in their democratic values and practices.93 In multiple cases, EU enlargement 
does not necessarily affect the quality of democracy in accession countries. While civil society 
tends to progresses the most during the accession process, it is not directly related to enlargement. 
Media tends to regress and electoral processes remain relatively stagnant. Governance and judicial 
reform, which are directly related to the enlargement process, show definitive improvements in 
official government documents. However, in practice these developments are “modest to nil.”94 
The problem of quality institutional change arises from the fact that EU-driven reforms are pushed 
by domestic elites in accession-seeking countries. The pace of institutional change tends to slow 
down after accession negotiations begin, as elites feel as though they have accomplished the 
necessary reforms. As a result, there are surface-level reforms that fail to truly effect change in 
states seeking EU membership. These states later display democratic backsliding.95  
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 The idea of democratic backsliding refers to a situation in which a state enacts the necessary 
reforms to gain entry into the EU, but then proceeds to erode these reforms once becoming a 
member state. 96  Some Eastern European countries that joined the EU, namely Bulgaria and 
Romania, exemplify the phenomenon of democratic backsliding. Significant changes occurred in 
these countries in 2007 in the areas of corruption, legislation, and state building. After the EU’s 
conditionality process ended, however, elite behavior in Bulgaria and Romania changed. Prior to 
2007, elites in Bulgaria and Romania considered political restraint necessary with regards to their 
relation to the EU. However, after 2007, this restraint was no longer deemed necessary, and elites 
instituted legislative reforms that deteriorated the rule of law and other democratic institutions. 
The changing elite dynamics resulted in an exacerbated corruption problem, the subversion of 
stable normative frameworks, and an abandonment of state-building efforts.97 Thus, while the EU 
was able to initially create institutional change in these cases, it was unable to create lasting 
institutional and democratic change.  
 Some studies have found a positive effect of NATO on democratization and institutional 
change in transitional countries. In candidate countries with a NATO Membership Action Plan 
(MAP), there is strong evidence that the NATO conditionality process has a positive impact on 
institutional change. Through one of its criteria for membership, NATO requires countries to 
commit to the rule of law and human right, the democratic control of armed forces, and the peaceful 
settlement of conflicts. NATO is able to offer a significant incentive to institutional development 
through its regional security promise. Thus, NATO offers security incentives that differ from the 
economic ones of the EU.98 
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 However, alternative analyses of the effect of NATO on institutional change find little to 
no evidence of a positive impact of NATO conditionality on institutional change. In examining 
cases of existing NATO members, as well as the accession of new members following the Cold 
War, NATO conditionality fails to demonstrate a positive impact on institutions. With regards to 
Turkey, an existing NATO member, NATO has been considered a destabilizing force. Turkey has 
experienced three breakdowns of democracy since 1952 – in 1960, 1971, and 1980. In each case, 
the breakdown in democracy has been attributed to military interventions that have been spurred 
by perceived civilian misgovernance of the military. As mentioned above, civilian control over the 
military is a necessary condition for NATO membership.99 
 Another means through which NATO is assumed to affect institutional is through the 
potential threat of ejection from the Alliance in the case of non-democratic change, and 
accompanying loss of the NATO security promise. However, NATO has never sanctioned, much 
less ejected, a member state for institutional change, despite that fact that it has had opportunities 
to exercise this right. Both Greece and Turkey experienced reversions to autocracy as NATO 
members, and Portugal was a member as a dictatorship. The non-democratic memberships of 
Greece, Turkey, and Portugal demonstrate that security concerns can be prioritized over liberal 
interests.100 The membership of these countries in NATO despite a lack of democratic governance 
indicates that NATO does not necessarily have a positive institutional effect on member states. 
Furthermore, it may be the case that NATO is wary of ejecting member states, as this would 
hamper NATO’s credibility and lessen the organization’s ability to attract new members.  
With regards to external governance and non-conditional forms of Western influence, 
relations with non-candidate and non-member states do not necessarily seek to promote democracy 
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or bring about democratic change. External governance instead promotes norms of democratic 
change and establishes institutional order in its neighborhood.101 Literature regarding the EU’s 
ENP and NATO’s PfP suggests a destabilizing effect of Western institutions on pro-Western 
sentiments. After the enlargement of the EU, the ENP was developed as an alternative strategy to 
enlargement to build good relationships with states surrounding the EU. However, since the launch 
of the ENP, there have been few signs of democratic progress in numerous areas. The lack of 
success of the ENP is linked to the fact that the ENP has divided Europe between EU member 
states and non-EU member states, thus distancing developing democracies from the EU. 102 
NATO’s PfP has had a similar effect. Empirically, inclusion in NATO did not promote democracy 
among members following the Cold War. The PfP’s conditionality regarding civilian control of 
the military has had unexpected adverse effects on strengthening the civilian hold on the military, 
as PfP programs focus on building the military rather than civilian expertise. This focus on military 
expertise contributes to the sentiment among the military that a relative lack of civilian knowledge 
makes civilian oversight unnecessary, which in turn undermines civilian control of the military. 
Thus, the lack of success in the PfP may be attributed to the failures of the program to create long-
term solutions for changes to military policy.103 
 
An Alternative Theory of Institutional Change 
 This study argues that that the role of EU and NATO conditionality may actually have 
counter-intuitive effects on institutional change in developing democracies. As mentioned above, 
the initiation of negotiations implies that the bargaining institution will provide the economic, 
political, and/or strategic benefits of membership once the developing democracy meets the 
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necessary political and economic objectives.104 However, in cases where the conditionality process 
is drawn out, support for joining the EU and/or NATO may decline among citizens of the 
developing democracy as citizens experience “accession fatigue”. Accession fatigue refers to a 
process in which citizens of a developing democracy tolerate numerous political and economic 
reforms with the expectation that they will be granted the benefits of accession. Regardless of if 
the reforms meet the full requirements for accession, the perception that reforms have been made 
without the extension of membership (or other reward) may drive citizens in developing 
democracies away from favoring the accession process.  
 Furthermore, because developing democracies increasingly delegate power to the 
electorate as part of their reform process, their leaders become increasingly accountable to their 
citizens. If citizens become disillusioned with the EU and/or NATO accession processes, there will 
be opportunities for anti-Western parties and representatives to gain political power through 
elections. As these anti-Western politicians gain power, they will be able to reverse the trend of 
democratic institutional change. In this way, the EU and NATO accession processes may have 
counter-productive effects on institutional change in developing democracies. Figure 1 below 
illustrates the process through which accession fatigue would occur and drive institutional change. 
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Figure 1 
 
  
 
Parts a and b of Figure 1 outline that the government of the developing democracy begins 
its negotiation process with the EU and/or NATO, and that citizens support the government in its 
negotiations due to the perceived benefits of accession. This occurs because once accession 
negotiations between a Western institution and the candidate country begin, there is an expectation 
that the applicant country will eventually receive the benefits of membership.105 Parts c and d of 
Figure 1 assert that as citizens face a prolonged accession process, the costs of accession will be 
seen as greater than the benefits of accession. This occurs because the expectation that the applicant 
state will receive the benefits of membership is not met in a timely manner. Thus, citizens perceive 
the costs of accession to be larger than the costs from making institutional changes. It is the lack 
of perceived credibility that lessens incentives to continue with domestic political changes.106  
 Sections e and f of Figure 1 outline that citizens will elect more anti-Western officials 
because they perceive the costs of accession to be too high. This occurs as citizens are no longer 
willing to endure the costs of the accession process, and would prefer abstaining from the process. 
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Citizens then elect the elites that will refrain from engaging the accession process. The final section, 
section g, of Figure 1 states that the anti-Western elites will halt and reverse democratic 
institutional changes in the country, which then leads to a regression on democratic values.  
 Ultimately, this alternative theory of institutional change is based on two ideas. First, it 
rests on the idea that the benefits of the accession process must be both enticing and credible 
enough that the government is willing to undergo the costs of making institutional changes. Second, 
it is based on the idea that the electorate has a role in shaping political decision-making in 
developing democracies. If the electorate begins to perceive the costs of accession as higher than 
the benefits of accession, then these citizens will no longer see the potential for accession as 
credible, and they will elect anti-Western elites who engage in democratic backsliding.  
 
 
 
Theory-Building Case: Turkey 
 
 Turkey serves as a motivating case for understanding the effect of the EU and NATO 
accession process on developing democracies, as it has had a prolonged EU accession process. 
The prospect of accession was embedded in the 1963 Association Agreement between Turkey and 
the EU’s precursor, the European Economic Community (EEC).107 In 1987, Turkey applied for 
full membership to the EEC, but the European Commission rejected the request on the grounds 
that Turkey had grave democratic deficiencies. 108  In 1999, however, Turkey was granted 
candidacy status with the EU.109 In 2005, Turkey had “sufficiently” progressed in its reforms to be 
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granted negotiating country status.110 While Turkey achieved negotiating status in 2005, it also 
stalled in its democratic progress.111  
 
Turkey’s Relationship with the EU 
 Prior to Turkey, candidates for EU accession have achieved full membership status. In fact, 
Turkey represents the only case of an accession process that has lasted over a decade. Considering 
that Turkey applied for European Community membership in 1987, Turkey has been in some form 
of an accession process with the EU for three decades. Unlike other candidate countries, Turkey’s 
membership is not likely in the foreseeable future.  Furthermore, changes in the EU itself have 
brought cleavages to the EU. These cleavages have narrowed the EU’s attention to the enlargement 
process, which means enlargement of any kind is unlikely in the near future.112 
 Support for EU membership among Turkish citizens has declined significantly as the 
accession process has continued to be drawn out. In 2004, support for EU membership among 
Turkish citizens peaked at 73 percent. Since 2007, however, support for EU membership has 
hovered between 38 and 48 percent.113 The loss of public support for Turkish membership in the 
EU has been largely attributed to the fact that citizens are increasingly convinced that Turkey faces 
a double-standard for accession, and that this double-standard is unattainable.114 
 Turkey has shown a distinct trend towards democratic backsliding, and statements from 
President Erdogan demonstrate a prevailing political belief that the EU offer of accession lacks 
credibility. In 2016, the Commissioner for European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement 
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Negotiations stated that “[The European Commission is] gravely concerned about the degradation 
of the rule of law and democracy unfolding in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt.” Turkey 
has demonstrated backsliding in numerous areas necessary for accession, most importantly 
fundamental rights and democratic institutions. Following the attempted coup in July 2016, Turkey 
declared a state of emergency under which far-reaching measures curtailing fundamental rights 
were taken. The Turkish government violated fundamental rights such as the prohibition of torture 
and ill-treatment, and the allotment of procedural rights for those accused of being involved in the 
coup. Discrimination and hostility towards vulnerable groups based on sexual orientation or gender 
identity also remains a serious concern for the European Commission.115  
 In terms of Turkey’s democratic institutions, the July 2016 coup was a direct attack on 
democratically elected institutions, which must be embedded in political culture for full 
democratization to be in place. Despite the severity of the threat to the Turkish state of democracy, 
the scale and nature of Erdogan’s measures to reduce the effects of the coup demonstrated evidence 
of Turkey’s democratic backsliding.116 Turkey’s democratic backsliding ultimately suggests that 
the Turkish government sees few incentives to continue with domestic political changes.117  
 Erdogan has demonstrated his belief that the EU’s accession offer is not credible in his 
public statements that threaten that Turkey will cease EU accession negotiations. In 2016, Erdogan 
suggested that Turkey could join the Shanghai Corporation Organization (SCO), a regional 
security bloc to fight threats posed by radical Islam and drug trafficking, instead of the EU. The 
SCO is comprised of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, and it 
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does not include conditions on political institutions for membership.118 Most recently, in 2017, 
Erdogan suggested that he may call for a referendum on whether Turkey should continue its 
accession talks with the EU. According to Erdogan, “Turkey has waited at the door (of the EU) 
for 54 years” without an offer for membership.119 Based on Erdogan’s growing distance from the 
EU, and his apparent willingness to cease negotiations, there is an implied sense that Turkish elites 
do not see EU accession as a credible outcome of negotiations. The already and low, and 
continuously declining, support for EU membership among Turkish citizens, which has existed 
since 2007, empowers these elites. 
 Despite transformations in politics, economics, and foreign policy, Turkey continues to fail 
to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria. Specifically, Tukey’s shortfalls lie in its stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, its rule of law, its human rights record, and its respect and 
protection of minorities. Because each of these issues lie at the core of the EU’s conditionality 
mechanisms, Turkey has been unable to meet the minimum requirements for EU membership, and 
the country’s ruling party, the AKP, has been reluctant to enact reform packages that would meet 
the Copenhagen criteria. 120  Thus, Turkey’s prolonged accession process has resulted in 
backsliding and increased anti-EU rhetoric.  
 The fact that Turkey has demonstrated a decline in public support for the EU over time 
supports the alternative theory proposed in this paper, as it shows that citizens may suffer from 
accession fatigue. Additionally, the fact that elites in Turkey have similarly adopted a negative 
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view towards the EU accession process provides support for the alternative theory of institutional 
change proposed in this paper, as it shows that anti-Western actors may gain power in the political 
process as citizens experience accession fatigue. Given Erdogan’s statements and the ruling party’s 
unwillingness to institute reforms, it is also clear that democratic backsliding is occurring in 
Turkey as a result of these factors.  
 
The Application of the Turkish Case to Georgia 
 
 Turkey and Georgia are comparable cases given the length of negotiations and 
deliberations each state has had with the EU and/or NATO, and both democracies are incomplete 
in their democratic transition. Like Turkey, Georgia is currently undergoing what it perceives as 
an extended EU and NATO accession process, as it is part of both the European Union’s ENP and 
NATO’s PfP.121 Georgia has been a part of the EaP since 2009, and it formally announced its 
aspirations to join NATO in 2002.122  
 Georgia has serious deficiencies in the areas of democracy building, military readiness, 
and its settling of territorial disputes with its neighbors. Even though Georgia has made 
considerable progress in democratic reforms since its Rose Revolution, the changes are still not 
comparable to Europe’s political democracy. 123  Both Georgia and Turkey also share similar 
characteristics in areas that play a role in the success or failure of accession – the role of culture, 
institutional and historical legacies, and credibility of the accession offer.  
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 Cultural factors play a critical role in determining the success of Western political 
conditionality. States that are more culturally similar to the West are more likely to see a successful 
accession processes, as these states are more like to meet the necessary democratization criteria. 
There is evidence to support that both Turkey and Georgia are perceived as culturally distant from 
Europe and the West despite both countries’ desires to join their respective Western organizations. 
Turkey’s religious and cultural traditions are seen as fundamentally different from “European 
values,” which has been cited as a reason for which Turkey has not been accepted into the EU.124 
Relative to Turkey, Georgia’s cultural history is more similar to that of Europe and the West, yet 
Georgia is still perceived as culturally different from Europe.125 Despite Georgia’s long-standing 
cultural similarities to the West, Georgia lies at the crossroads of the Black Sea, the Caucuses, and 
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Central Asia, spanning Europe and Central Eurasia. Georgia’s position thus distances it from 
Europe and the West, and makes it seem more culturally dissimilar.126 Due to the perceived 
cultural differences among EU member states of both Turkey and Georgia, Turkey serves as a 
viable theory-building case for this study.  
 Regarding institutional and historical legacies, both Turkey and Georgia are relatively 
recent democratizing states that do not have longstanding democratic histories. While Turkey had 
continuous free and fair multi-party elections since 1946, from 1960 to 1997 its senior military 
command disposed of four governments. The General Staff, which presides over Turkey’s armed 
forces, oversaw anti-democratic constitutional changes during this time, including a 1982 
constitution that focused on protecting the government rather than ensuring civil rights. In 1997, 
the military forced Turkey’s first Islamist-led government out when the prime minister refused to 
implement policies that undermined freedom of expression, weakened the independence of the 
press, and criminalized thought. When Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, the AKP, came 
to power in 2002, it reduced the role of the military in politics, promised personal freedoms to 
Turkish citizens, and made it harder to close political parties and ban politicians. However, over 
the past decade Erdogan has used the bureaucracy to undermine political opponents and establish 
state security courts, which his government previously abolished.127 Because Turkey’s democratic 
traditions have been disrupted numerous times since 1960, Turkey’s modern history is not 
characteristic of a state with a strong institutional legacy of democracy.  
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 Similarly, Georgia’s democratic legacy is also a relatively recent phenomenon. Prior to the 
2003 Rose Revolution, Georgia was a mixed regime, with some elements of democracy and 
authoritarianism. Moreover, Georgia’s transition to a democratic system was distinctly the product 
of a drastic revolution led by a Western-educated politician, which indicates that Georgia’s 
democratic institutions are not a product of historical legacy, but rather the adoption of Western 
political practices.128 Thus, the Turkish EU accession case can be applied to the Georgian case for 
EU and NATO accession on the basis of comparable institutional and historical legacies. 
 Regarding the role of Western credibility, it is clear that Erdogan is not credibly convinced 
that Turkey will at some point join the EU. As described in the theory-building section, Turkey 
has demonstrated democratic backsliding, and Turkish public opinion as well as Erdogan’s 
statements suggest that Turkey is becoming disillusioned with the accession process in the absence 
of a credible accession offer.129 
 For Georgia, the case for a lack of Western credibility of EU and NATO accession is based 
on Georgia’s political position and security status. Because Georgia is still considered part of 
Russia’s “near abroad,” it would be a vulnerable EU and/or NATO member. Georgia is in a 
precarious political situation due to its armed conflict with Russia during the 2008 Georgian-
Russian War, its disputed territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the fact that Russia 
considers Georgia to be in its sphere of influence. Thus, the extension of the EU and NATO into 
the region would have implications for the West in terms of security commitments.130 Because of 
Georgia’s vulnerable security status, offers of EU and NATO accession may not necessarily be 
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considered credible in the future, as Georgina politicians may grow to believe that Georgia’s 
security status is too much of a limiting factor.  
 Both Turkey and Georgia face obstacles to accession given their cultural differences from 
Europe, their lack of a long-standing institutional democracy, and potential for a lack of a 
perceived credible accession offer. Because of these similarities, the factors that support the 
alternative theory of this paper from the Turkish case may also be apparent in Georgia. This study 
thus investigates three hypotheses that relate to the alternative theory of institutional change 
proposed in this study. 
 
 
 
Hypotheses  
 The study investigates three hypotheses. Each of these hypotheses corresponds to a section 
of the alternative theory. Taken together, these hypotheses explain the alternative theory of 
institutional change proposed earlier in this study. The three hypotheses are as follows:  
 HI: There is a parabolic relationship between time and public support for the EU and/or 
NATO accession process. 
H1(a): The change in public support for the EU and/or NATO accession process is 
particularly apparent among certain groups that previously were more inclined to 
support the EU and/or NATO accession process.  
 H2: Political parties and elites that are opposed to Western institutions will gain power as 
the electorate increasingly feels disillusioned with the EU and/or NATO accession process, while 
pro-Western parties and elites will gain power when the electorate is in favor of the EU and/or 
NATO accession process. 
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 H3: As anti-Western elites and/or parties are elected, developing democracies will engage 
in democratic backsliding. 
 Under H1, citizens become fatigued with institutional change when the “reward” of EU 
and/or NATO membership is not fulfilled. This hypothesis is tested with an analysis of changes in 
perceptions of the EU and NATO accession process among Georgian citizens in public opinion 
polls. The addition to H1, H1a, is tested using multiple linear regressions to analyze changes in 
perceptions of the EU and NATO accession process among particular groups of Georgian citizens. 
 Under H2, citizens who are disillusioned with the accession process will elect anti-Western 
officials who will cease to engage in EU and/or NATO accession. This hypothesis is tested with 
an examination of trends in support for anti-Western and pro-Western parties in Georgia.  
 Under H3, the process of democratic backsliding will occur as more anti-Western elites 
and/or political parties take office in the developing democracy. For this hypothesis to be true, the 
democratic backsliding would have to occur after the election of the anti-Western elites and/or 
parties. This hypothesis is tested through a comparison of institutional change in Georgia and 
Turkey over time.  
 
 
 
Methodology, Research Design, and Data Description 
 
 This study applies a mixed methods approach to understanding the role of EU and NATO 
conditionality on institutional change in the case of Georgia. There are three sections of mixed 
quantitative and qualitative analysis in this study.  
The first section uses data from the Caucus Research Resource Center (CRRC) to gauge 
the Georgian public opinion towards EU and NATO membership. The data used comes from the 
CRRC’s Caucasus Barometer Survey, which is the CRRC’s annual household survey about social, 
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economic, and political issues in Georgia. 131 In this first section, the dependent variable is support 
for the EU and/or NATO accession process. The independent variable is the number of years 
passed in the accession process. This section also uses a series of multiple linear regression models 
to analyze changes in support for the EU and NATO accession process among specific segments 
of the Georgian population over time. 
The second section of this paper uses data regarding the number of parliamentary seats 
won by various parties in Georgia in 2008, 2012, and 2016.132 This section examines how changes 
in public opinion towards the EU and NATO accession processes coincide with the election of 
either pro-Western or anti-Western parties to the Georgian Parliament.  
The third section of this paper compares institutional change in Georgia to the theory-
building case, Turkey. This section will pull data from The Quality of Government (QoG) Institute. 
Specifically, this study uses the Liberal Democracy Index, as this measure is available for both 
countries. This measure also captures each country’s level of democracy, as well as each country’s 
commitment to liberal values, both of which are central to the EU and NATO accession 
processes.133 This section compares institutional change in the two cases because Georgia is not 
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as far along in the process of the proposed theory of institutional change as Turkey is, and thus the 
impact of anti-Western parties and elites cannot be seen in Georgia in the same way it can be seen 
in Turkey.  
 
 
 
Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of the Georgian Case 
 This section is broken into three parts. The first section uses quantitative analysis to 
examine trends and changes in Georgian citizens’ support for the EU and NATO accession process. 
The second session uses a mixed quantitative and qualitative analysis of popular support for and 
the election of anti-Western and pro-Western parties to parliament in the 2008, 2012, and 2016 
parliamentary elections. Lastly, the third section compares institutional change in Turkey and 
Georgia over time since each country’s accession process has begun.  
 
Declining Popular Support for Joining the EU and NATO 
 According to public opinion data from the CRRC, support for Georgia’s membership in 
the EU and NATO has been declining since 2011 for the EU, and since 2010 for NATO. In 2011, 
support among Georgian’s for EU membership was at 69 percent. By 2015, this public support 
declined to 42 percent. Meanwhile, the percentage of Georgians indifferent to membership has 
increased from 12 percent to 27 percent, and the percentage of Georgian citizens opposed to 
Georgia’s membership in the EU has risen from 5 percent to 15 percent in the same time period.134 
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With regards to NATO membership, support for NATO membership peaked at 70 percent in 2010, 
but has since declined to 37 percent in 2015.135 These trends can be seen in Figures 1 and 2 in 
Appendix A. Figure 1 shows trends in Georgian citizens’ support for the EU accession, and Figure 
2 shows trends for Georgian citizens’ support for NATO accession. The declining support for EU 
and NATO membership among Georgian citizens clearly indicates the potential for “accession 
fatigue” in Georgia, supporting the basis of H1.  
 Tables 1 through 7, which can be found in Appendix A, analyze trends in EU and NATO 
support among Georgian citizens from 2008 through 2015 in greater detail. For each year of 
available Caucus Barometer data from the CRRC, a multiple linear regression (MLR) is used to 
examine the effects of various individual characteristics – including gender, age, education level, 
and settlement type (rural, urban, or the capital, Tbilisi) – on the predicted likelihood of support 
for Georgia’s EU and/or NATO membership.  
 The available years are 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2015. Gender is measured 
as a dummy variable, in which the variable MALE is represented with a 1 when the respondent is 
male, and with a 0 when the respondent is female. The variable AGE is a continuous variable, in 
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which each respondent’s age is recorded at the time of the survey. The EDU variable represents 
level of education, and it is measured on a scale of 1 to 8: 1 corresponds to “no primary education,” 
2 corresponds to “primary education (either complete or incomplete),” 3 corresponds to 
“incomplete secondary education,” 4 corresponds to “completed secondary education,” 5 
corresponds to “secondary technical education,” 6 corresponds to “incomplete higher education,” 
7 corresponds to “completed higher education (B.A., M.A., or Specialist degree),” and 8 
corresponds to “post-graduate degree”. The settlement type variable is divided into three dummy 
variables: RURAL, URBAN, and TBS. The RURAL variable represents those individuals that live 
in rural areas of Georgia, the URBAN variable represents those individuals that live in urban areas, 
and the TBS variable represents those individuals that live in the capital, Tbilisi. Tbilisi is separated 
from other urban settlement areas because it is significantly more urban that other urbanized areas 
of Georgia. The tables were created in R Studio, and the code used for organizing and manipulating 
the original CRRC datasets may be found in Appendix B. 
Traditionally, age, education level, and settlement type are thought to be predictors of 
Georgians’ likely support for EU and/or NATO membership. Age is thought to correspond with 
support for EU and NATO accession in that younger Georgians, who are typically more Western, 
are more likely to support democracy and institutional change than older Georgians who may be 
more sympathetic to Russia due to their ties to the Soviet Union. Education level is thought to 
correspond with support for the EU and NATO accession processes, as more educated individuals 
are more likely to recognize the benefits to making institutional changes both for the purpose of 
institutional development and for the associated rewards that come with accession. Lastly, 
settlement type is thought to be associated with support for the EU and NATO because more urban 
areas of Georgia, specifically the capital, are seen as significantly more Western and well-educated 
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than the rest of the country. Thus, citizens from the capital (and other urban areas) are more likely 
to support accession with Western institutions.  
 For each available year, age is a statistically significant predictor of Georgian citizens’ 
likelihood of supporting the respective accession processes at the 99 percent level. The general 
pattern suggests that for each additional year older that a Georgian citizen is, they are slightly less 
likely to support EU and/or NATO accession. While this pattern holds true for each year of 
available data, the specific coefficient on age for 2015 shows a marked increase in the amount by 
which Georgian citizens are increasingly less likely to support EU and/or NATO accession as they 
grow older. In earlier years, the coefficient on age for support of EU and/or NATO accession 
hovered around -0.002 to -0.006. However, in 2015, this coefficient increased in magnitude to         
-0.008 for both accession processes. While the coefficient is still low in that it suggests that for 
each additional year in age a Georgian citizen will only be 0.8 percent less likely to support EU 
and/or NATO membership, this percentage compounds over generational time spans. As this 
percentage compounds, it means that generations of Georgian citizens will have more politically 
significant differences in their support of the EU and/or NATO accession process.  
 Furthermore, the fact that 2015 showed a larger change in the predicted decline in support 
for EU and/or NATO membership over time than in previous years points to two potential key 
changes among the Georgian population. First, the large decline suggests that over time, citizens 
who once supported the EU and/NATO accession process have since changed their opinions on 
the value of the EU and/or NATO as valuable partners to Georgia. Second, the larger decline 
suggests that the same Georgian citizens who may have participated in the Rose Revolution in 
2003 may be drifting away from the pro-Western values they once had.  If either or both of these 
trends are the case, there is support for the idea that a prolonged EU and/or NATO accession 
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process has counter-productive effects on demands for democratic change in developing 
democracies. As citizens see that domestic reforms do not necessarily result in the reward of EU 
and/or NATO membership, they may feel disillusioned with the process. This disillusionment has 
the potential to then manifest itself in the form of less pro-Western and less pro-democratic parties 
and officials. 
 Since 2009, education has consistently suggested that for each additional level of education, 
Georgian citizens are more likely to support EU and/or NATO accession. The coefficients on the 
education variable are positive and statistically a significant for each year since 2009. Thus, 
support for joining the EU and NATO has generally been increasing among the educated 
population. However, in 2015, the coefficient on education decreased in magnitude from 0.079 to 
0.053. This change suggests that each additional level of education attained predicts a 5.3 percent 
increase in likely support for EU accession, as opposed to the prior 7.9 percent increase in the 
likely support for EU accession. Regarding predicted support for NATO, the coefficient on 
education has been more stable over time, and does not show the same sudden decrease in 
predicted support for accession based on education. The stability of the predicted support for 
NATO accession based on educational attainment may be a product of the fact that Georgia’s 
breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia pose a significant enough barrier to Georgia’s 
NATO membership such that more highly educated citizens are more likely to recognize the 
improbability of Georgia being admitted into NATO, regardless of the amount of time Georgia 
spends awaiting membership.  
 The change in predicted support for the EU based on educational attainment is in line with 
the general fall in support for EU accession among Georgian citizens. Theoretically, more educated 
citizens should be more likely to support joining the EU because they recognize the benefits to 
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accession, and understand the necessary costs that must be imposed in the form of institutional 
reforms. However, the fact that likely support for the EU accession process is declining among 
educated Georgians suggests that even those who recognize the costs and benefits of joining the 
EU perceive the costs as exceedingly high for the potential benefits. This trend supports the idea 
that a prolonged accession process may lead to accession fatigue, as even citizens who understand 
the costs and time of the accession process become dissatisfied. These educated citizens may 
believe that Georgia has made sufficient reforms to earn some benefits of accession. Because the 
perceived reforms have been met with no reward, however, educated Georgians may increasingly 
perceive the EU accession process as being unjust.  This dissatisfaction among educated Georgian 
similarly has the potential to allow for the rise of less pro-Western and pro-democratic parties, as 
citizens find alternative means of governance that are still satisfactory to their interests.  
 As previously mentioned, the lack of a large change in the coefficient on education for 
NATO support could be due to the fact that educated Georgians recognize that Georgia’s internal 
territorial disputes and precarious relationship with Russia complicate Georgia’s NATO prospects. 
Since Georgia’s territorial disputes have not yet been resolved, it is likely that educated Georgians 
do not see the prolonged accession process as unjust since they have not made progress on a 
necessary factor for NATO accession. Thus, the data regarding predicted support for NATO 
accession among educated Georgians still reasonably falls in line with the theory proposed in this 
study.  
  Lastly, the coefficient for settlement type, particularly for Tbilisi, is inconsistently 
significant and changes direction over time with regards to both EU and NATO support. Because 
of the inconsistent significance and variation over time, settlement type is not as strong of a 
predictor of support for the EU and NATO accession processes as originally thought. While Tbilisi 
47 
 
is generally thought to be associated with more Western values and more educated citizens, the 
fact that the coefficient on Tbilisi does not vary consistently with other variables suggests 
otherwise. This variation instead likely suggests that Tbilisi itself varies too much in terms of its 
composition to independently predict changes in EU and/or NATO support. 
 Ultimately, this quantitative analysis of Georgia reveals that not only is support for the EU 
and NATO declining over time in a politically significant way, but that factors that typically predict 
higher support for the EU and NATO accession processes (such as being younger and having 
higher educational attainment) are also showing a declining trend of support for the EU and NATO 
accession processes. The fact that these trends are occurring provides support for H1a of this paper, 
which states that change in public support for the EU and/or NATO accession process is 
particularly apparent among certain groups that previously were more inclined to support the EU 
and/or NATO accession process.  
 
Anti-Western and Pro-Western Representation in Georgia’s Parliament 
 A further analysis of Georgia’s 2008, 2012, and 2016 parliamentary elections reveals that 
there may be an increasing trend towards supporting more anti-Western parties. Georgia has a 
mixed parliamentary election system in which 73 lawmakers out of 150 are elected in 73 
majoritarian, single-mandate constituencies. The other 77 seats are allocated proportionally among 
political parties and election blocs, and each party or bloc must achieve a clear 5 percent threshold 
for seats to be allocated.136  
 In 2008, the United National Movement (UNM) won 59.18 percent of the proportional 
vote, securing 119 seats in total with its majoritarian victories.137 The UNM is Saakashvili’s party, 
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(accessed 7 April 2017). 
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which advocates for the rule of law, accountability, and transparency in government; favors greater 
integration with the West; and supports the development of a “free and democratic society”.138 A 
Nine-Party Opposition Bloc won the second-largest share of the seats in parliament in 2008, with 
a 17.73 percent share of the proportional vote, securing 17 seats in total.139 The opposition bloc 
represented an alternative democratic coalition to Saakashvili’s party that focused on balancing 
executive power with a strong parliament. However, the opposition bloc was still in favor of 
pursuing membership in the EU and NATO.140 The other three parties to win seats in Georgia’s 
2008 parliamentary elections, the Christian Democrats, the Georgian Labour Party, and the Party 
of Republicans, each also had pro-Western platforms.141  While there is no data regarding popular 
support for EU and/or NATO accession for 2008, the fact that no pro-Russian or anti-Western 
party won a proportion of seats in the Georgian parliament suggests that Georgian citizens 
supported EU and NATO accession, and elected the corresponding pro-Western parties. 
 In 2012, two parties dominated Georgia’s parliamentary elections. The Georgian Dream 
party, which emerged from the 2008 nine-party coalition, won 54.97 percent of the proportional 
vote, which represents 44 parliament seats. It also won 41 majoritarian seats, securing a final total 
of 85 parliament seats.142 The Georgian Dream Party, which represents the multi-party coalition, 
was created by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, and since its creation has supported Georgia’s 
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continued integration with the EU and NATO.143 The UNM won 40.34 percent of the proportional 
vote, earning the UNM 33 parliament seats. It also won 32 majoritarian districts, leaving the party 
with 65 seats in parliament.144 While the Georgian Dream and UNM are political rivals, both 
parties have a pro-Western platform and support EU and NATO integration.145 The Georgian 
Dream and UNM dominated the parliamentary elections in 2012 when popular support for EU and 
NATO accession were at or near their peak.146 The fact that the parliamentary elections reflected 
strong public support for the EU and NATO in 2012 supports H2, as it shows how the role of the 
pro-Western electorate translated itself into a pro-Western Georgian parliament. 
 The 2016 parliamentary election was still dominated by largely pro-Western parties, 
however, a pro-Russian, Eurosceptic party managed to secure a small proportion of seats in 
parliament. The Georgian Dream Party won 48.68 percent of the proportional vote, which 
corresponds to 44 parliament seats. The party also won 23 majoritarian seats, for a total of 67 
parliament seats.147 The UNM won 27.11 percent of the proportional vote, which corresponds to 
27 parliament seats. The UNM did not win any majoritarian districts, and thus came out of the 
parliamentary election with 27 total seats in parliament.148 While the two pro-Western parties won 
a combined majority in parliament, the Alliance of Patriots of the Georgia-United Opposition won 
5.01 percent of the vote, which allocated six seats to a pro-Russian party that strongly opposes 
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Georgia’s NATO integration.149 This pro-Russian party win comes at a time when popular support 
for Georgia’s accession to the EU and NATO hit record lows in 2015. In 2015, popular support 
for Georgia joining the EU was at 42 percent, and popular support for Georgia joining NATO was 
at 37 percent.150 The fact that a pro-Russian, anti-NATO party won seats in the 2016 parliamentary 
election also suggests that there is credibility to H2, which asserts that political parties and elites 
that are opposed to Western institutions will gain power as the electorate increasingly feels 
disillusioned with the Western system. 
 The fact that patterns of representation for pro-Western and anti-Western parties in 
parliament correspond to popular support for EU and NATO accession supports this paper’s 
assertion that as the electorate becomes disillusioned with the EU and NATO due to a prolonged 
accession process, anti-Western parties have opportunities to seize power. These trends 
collectively support H2 of this paper. While anti-Western parties have yet to achieve a majority 
representation in Georgia, initial parliament trends, along with more long-term public opinion 
trends, suggest that in the future Georgia may drift away from the West’s democratic values. This 
drift from democratic values may manifest itself in democratic backsliding, as has been seen in the 
case of Turkey.   
 
Comparing Institutional Change in Georgia and Turkey 
 The Liberal Democracy Index from the QoG Institute “emphasizes the importance of 
protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the 
majority. The liberal model takes a ‘negative’ view of political power insofar as it judges the 
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quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally 
protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and 
balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of liberal 
democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.”151 Thus, the Liberal 
Democracy Index measures both democratic institutions in terms of the existence of electoral 
mechanisms, as well liberal values that are central to the EU and NATO accession processes in 
terms of presence of institutions that defend liberal values in the country being assessed. The 
Liberal Democracy Index ranges on a scale of 0 to 1, in which a low score corresponds to less 
liberal democracy, and a high score corresponds to a more liberal democracy.152  
 Using the QoG Data Visualization Map, the Liberal Democracy Index can be traced for 
both Georgia and Turkey from 1995 to 2015.153 This study focuses on specific years for both 
countries that represent key turning points in their respective accession process.154 In 1995, Turkey 
had a Liberal Democracy Index score of 0.40.155 When Turkey achieved its EU candidacy status 
in 1999,  its Liberal Democracy Index had increased to 0.44.156 By 2005, when Turkey achieved 
its negotiating status with the EU, its Liberal Democracy Index had risen to 0.48.157 Shortly after 
achieving negotiating status, however, Turkey’s Liberal Democracy Index began to decline, 
resulting in a fall from 0.48 in 2005 to 0.29 in 2016.158 The fact that Turkey’s Liberal Democracy 
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Index has fallen the most since it has entered an official, prolonged negotiation status with the EU 
supports H3 of this study, which hypothesizes that as anti-Western elites and/or parties are elected, 
developing democracies will engage in democratic backsliding.  
 From 1995 to 2002, Georgia was not considered a democracy, and its Liberal Democracy 
Index score varied from 0.19 to 0.23.159 Even after the 2003 Rose Revolution, Georgia still had a 
low Liberal Democracy Index of 0.24.160 However, by 2009, when Georgia was integrated in the 
EaP, its Liberal Democracy Index had increased from 0.24 in 2003, to 0.38 in 2009.161 Since being 
incorporated into the EaP, Georgia’s Liberal Democracy Index has risen to 0.54 in 2015.162 This 
rise in Georgia’s Liberal Democracy Index since being incorporated into the EaP is similar to the 
rise of Turkey’s Liberal Democracy Index in 1999 and 2005.   
 The fact that Georgia’s pattern of institutional change is similar to that of Turkey’s suggests 
that Georgia may engage in democratic backsliding in the future if its accession processes are 
prolonged. Like Turkey, Georgia saw an increase in its development of liberal democracy shortly 
after entering into stronger, more-official relations with the EU. Because Georgia has not entered 
a formal negotiation process, and because its relationship with the EU has not been as long as 
Turkey’s, Georgia is likely in an earlier stage of the alternative theory of institutional change 
proposed in this study. However, the Turkish case of institutional change supports the assertion of 
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H3 of this study regarding a reversal of institutional democratic development as anti-Western 
sentiments emerge in the general public and among the elites.  
 
 
 
Conclusions   
 This paper investigates the role of the EU and NATO on institutional change in the 
Republic of Georgia. The paper first outlines Georgia’s democratic history and relationship with 
Western institutions. Then, it summarizes existing literature on what determines the success of EU 
and NATO, and examines existing theories of institutional change. The study proposes an 
alternative theory of institutional change in which accession fatigue may lead to the election of 
non-democratic officials who then institute anti-democratic reforms. In using Turkey as a theory 
building case, and in using a mixed qualitative and quantitative analysis of Georgia, this study 
finds a number of results that support the proposed hypotheses and alternative theory of 
institutional change.  
 
Summary of Results 
 Overall, this paper finds preliminary support for each of the original proposed hypotheses. 
Support for H1 is found in the fact that public opinion in both Turkey and Georgia has changed 
over time such that there is less public support for EU and/or NATO accession processes. Support 
for H2 is found in the fact that political elites in Turkey, namely Erdogan, have made more anti-
Western statements in recent years, and the fact that a pro-Russian and anti-Western party gained 
seats in Georgia’s 2016 Parliamentary elections. The rise in anti-Western elite sentiments in 
Turkey and the election of an anti-Western party in Georgia each coincide with rising levels of 
dissatisfaction in the public with the EU and/or NATO accession process. This pattern thus follows 
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the alternative theory of institutional change proposed in this study. Lastly, support for H3 is found 
in the fact that Turkey has demonstrated democratic backsliding since its accession process has 
become prolonged. Since it is still too early to determine the impact of the election of Georgia’s 
anti-Western party to Parliament, there is no support for H3 in the Georgian case as of now. 
However, given the similarity of Turkey in Georgia in their cultural, institutional, and strategic 
factors, this study argues that it is possible for Georgia to follow the same pattern of institutional 
change as Turkey. Because Georgia’s institutional change is still ongoing, future studies should 
continue to trace Georgia’s democratic development, as this could provide further evidence to 
either support or refute H3 of this study.  
 
Areas for Further Study 
 Because this study uses Georgia as a current case-study, further studies regarding Georgia’s 
institutional change should focus on incorporating future developments in Georgia’s political 
process into either the theoretical framework presented in this study or another theory of 
institutional change. Such studies would be able to determine whether or not Georgia’s pattern of 
institutional change will in fact follow that of Turkey. Additionally, such studies would be valuable 
in determining what factors may make a developing democracy more or less resilient to democratic 
backsliding. 
 In the same vein, further studies could apply the alternative theory of institutional change 
proposed in this paper to other country cases. Applying the theoretical framework proposed in this 
paper to other cases would assist in determining the true plausibility of the theory. Furthermore, 
additional cases would likely be able to distinguish key factors that may affect how likely a 
developing democracy is to follow through on making institutional changes.  
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 Other studies could further focus on determining the varying role that EU and NATO have 
in fostering institutional change both in Georgia and other developing democracies. While studies 
in the past have sought to investigate the successes and failures of the EU and NATO, recent 
developments in the stability of the EU and NATO may have an impact on the future ability of 
these organizations to affect institutional change in developing democracies. For example, the role 
of Britain’s exit from the EU (“Brexit”), or the role of NATO’s extension of membership to 
Montenegro could affect the future credibility of the EU and NATO, and thus influence these 
organizations’ ability to effect institutional change. These studies would help in expanding the 
current literature regarding the use of the EU and NATO as agents of institutional change.  
 
Policy Implications 
 Presumably, the EU and NATO do not want to see Georgia drift away from democratic 
values in the same way that Turkey has, as a less democratic Georgia could potentially be seen as 
a destabilizing development. A less democratic Georgia would also mean that policies such as the 
ENP and PfP have failed in their goals of fostering more friendly relations between Europe and its 
neighbors. 
 While Georgia has yet to show democratic backsliding in its measures of institutional 
change, Georgia has also not had a three-decade long accession process with the EU in the same 
way that Turkey has.163 However, to the extent that Georgia has shown an increase in its liberal 
democracy within a relatively short time frame, Georgia is following Turkey’s pattern of 
institutional change.  
 Because the patterns of institutional change in Georgia are somewhat consistent with those 
of Turkey, and because Turkey and Georgia share numerous similarities in their cultural 
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differences from the West, their short-lived democratic histories, and the lack of credibility of EU 
and NATO offers of accession, it is possible, if not likely, that Georgia will continue to follow 
Turkey’s patterns of institutional change. If it is assumed that Georgia will continue to follow 
Turkey’s path of institutional change, the EU and NATO would need to consider alternative 
policies to ensure Georgia’s democratic institutional development. On one hand, it may be the case 
that either or both organizations should accelerate Georgia’s desired path to membership in order 
to ensure accession fatigue does not result in a reversal of institutional change. On the other hand, 
it may be the case that the EU and NATO should abandon their negotiations and partnerships with 
Georgia, or at least make clear their intentions for whether or not Georgia will be incorporated into 
either organization, as these actions could lessen the potential for resentment toward these Western 
organizations among the Georgian population. Alternatively, if further studies find different 
patterns in Georgia’s continued institutional development, then the current EU and NATO 
partnerships with Georgia may be sufficient.  
 Any change in policies regarding Georgia’s prospects for partnerships or membership with 
the EU and NATO will have to consider the role of Russia’s foreign policy. Due to Georgia’s prior 
conflict with Russia, Georgia’s separatist territories, and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, 
Georgia represents a unique case for the role of the EU and NATO in institutional change. 
Furthermore, Russia’s annexation of Crimea may have played a role in the change of Georgian 
citizens’ support for EU and/or NATO accession. Given that Russia used Ukraine’s pro-Western 
policies as a pretext for the annexation of Crimea, Georgian citizens may have grown weary of 
allying with Western organizations for fear of triggering another conflict with Russia in the 
separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the same time, it may be that because 
Georgia has already endured a Russian incursion of its territory in response to Georgia’s pro-
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Western policies that Georgia is not concerned with moving forward with pro-Western policies, 
as it has already been made clear to Russia that the Georgian government is pro-Western.  
 While these considerations certainly complicate the implications of the theoretical 
framework presented in this study, as well as the resulting policy implications, these considerations 
could also assist in better understanding the future role of the EU and NATO in Eurasia, as other 
Eurasian states may face similar obstacles in their EU and NATO relations.  
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Appendix B 
install.packages("foreign") 
library(foreign) 
 
# Extract data re: NATO and EU support from Caucus Barometer survey for each year 
CRRC2015ge <- read.dta("[insert location of data on computer here]") 
EUandNATO2015 <- subset(CRRC2015ge, country=Georgia, select=c(ID, SEX, AGE, 
RESPEDU, STRATUM, NATOSUPP, EUSUPP, TRUSTEU)) 
View(EUandNATO2015) 
 
CRRC2013ge <- read.dta("[insert location of data on computer here]") 
EUandNATO2013 <- subset(CRRC2013ge, country=Georgia, select=c(ID, RESPSEX, 
RESPAGE, RESPEDU, STRATUM, NATOSUPP, EUSUPP, TRUSTEU)) 
View(EUandNATO2013) 
 
CRRC2012ge <- read.dta("[insert location of data on computer here]") 
EUandNATO2012 <- subset (CRRC2012ge, country=Georgia, select=c(ID, RESPSEX, 
RESPAGE, RESPEDU, STRATUM, NATOSUPP, EUSUPP, TRUSTEU)) 
View(EUandNATO2012) 
 
 
CRRC2011ge <- read.dta("[insert location of data on computer here]") 
EUandNATO2011 <- subset (CRRC2011ge, country=Georgia, select=c(ID, RESPSEX, AGE, 
RESPEDU, STRATUM, NATOSUPP, EUSUPP, TRUSTEU)) 
View(EUandNATO2011) 
 
CRRC2010ge <- read.dta("[insert location of data on computer here]") 
EUandNATO2010 <- subset (CRRC2010ge, country=Georgia, select=c(ID, RESPSEX, 
RESPAGE, RESPEDU, STRATUM, NATOSUPP, TRUSTEU)) 
View(EUandNATO2010) 
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CRRC2009ge <- read.dta("[insert location of data on computer here]") 
EUandNATO2009 <- subset (CRRC2009ge, country=Georgia, select=c(ID, RESPSEX, 
RESPAGE, RESPEDU, STRATUM, NATOSUPP, TRUSTEU)) 
View(EUandNATO2009) 
 
CRRC2008ge <- read.dta("[insert location of data on computer here]") 
EUandNATO2008 <- subset (CRRC2008ge, country=Georgia, select=c(ID, RESPSEX, 
RESPAGE, RESPEDU, STRATUM, NATOSUPP, TRUSTEU)) 
View(EUandNATO2008) 
 
# Rename columns 
names(EUandNATO2015) <- c("ID", "MALE", "AGE", "EDU", "STRATUM", "NATOSUPP", 
"EUSUPP", "TRUSTEU") 
names(EUandNATO2013) <- c("ID", "MALE", "AGE", "EDU", "STRATUM", "NATOSUPP", 
"EUSUPP", "TRUSTEU") 
names(EUandNATO2012) <- c("ID", "MALE", "AGE", "EDU", "STRATUM", "NATOSUPP", 
"EUSUPP", "TRUSTEU") 
names(EUandNATO2011) <- c("ID", "MALE", "AGE", "EDU", "STRATUM", "NATOSUPP", 
"EUSUPP", "TRUSTEU") 
names(EUandNATO2010) <- c("ID", "MALE", "AGE", "EDU", "STRATUM", "NATOSUPP", 
"TRUSTEU") 
names(EUandNATO2009) <- c("ID", "MALE", "AGE", "EDU", "STRATUM", "NATOSUPP", 
"TRUSTEU") 
names(EUandNATO2008) <- c("ID", "MALE", "AGE", "EDU", "STRATUM", "NATOSUPP", 
"TRUSTEU") 
 
# Add columns for STRATUM 
 
EUandNATO2015$RURAL <- NA 
EUandNATO2015$URBAN <- NA 
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EUandNATO2015$TBS <- NA 
 
EUandNATO2013$RURAL <- NA 
EUandNATO2013$URBAN <- NA 
EUandNATO2013$TBS <- NA 
 
EUandNATO2012$RURAL <- NA 
EUandNATO2012$URBAN <- NA 
EUandNATO2012$TBS <- NA 
 
EUandNATO2011$RURAL <- NA 
EUandNATO2011$URBAN <- NA 
EUandNATO2011$TBS <- NA 
 
EUandNATO2010$RURAL <- NA 
EUandNATO2010$URBAN <- NA 
EUandNATO2010$TBS <- NA 
 
EUandNATO2009$RURAL <- NA 
EUandNATO2009$URBAN <- NA 
EUandNATO2009$TBS <- NA 
 
EUandNATO2008$RURAL <- NA 
EUandNATO2008$URBAN <- NA 
EUandNATO2008$TBS <- NA 
 
# Recode categorical data, 2015 data 
EUandNATO2015[,2] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,2] == "Male", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,2] == "Female", 0, ''))  
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EUandNATO2015[,4] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,4] == "No primary education", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,4] == "Primary education (either complete or incomplete)", 2, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,4] == "Incomplete secondary education", 3, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,4] == "Completed secondary education", 4, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,4] == "Secondary technical education", 5, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,4] == "Incomplete higher education", 6, ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,4] 
== "Completed higher education (BA, MA, or Specialist degree)", 7, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,4] == "Post-graduate degree", 8, '')))))))) 
EUandNATO2015[,5] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,5] == "Rural", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,5] == "Urban", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,5] == "Capital", 3, ''))) 
EUandNATO2015[,6] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,6] == "Don't support at all", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,6] == "Rather not support", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,6] == 
"Partially support, partially don't support", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,6] == "Rather support", 
4, ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,6] == "Fully support", 5, ''))))) 
EUandNATO2015[,7] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,7] == "Don't support at all", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,7] == "Rather not support", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,7] == 
"Partially support, partially don't support", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,7] == "Rather support", 
4, ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,7] == "Fully support", 5, ''))))) 
EUandNATO2015[,8] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,8] == "Fully distrust", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,8] == "Rather distrust", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,8] == "Neither 
trust not distrust", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,8] == "Rather trust", 4, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2015[,7] == "Fully trust ", 5, ''))))) 
EUandNATO2015$RURAL[EUandNATO2015$STRATUM==1]<-1 
EUandNATO2015$RURAL[EUandNATO2015$STRATUM==2]<-0 
EUandNATO2015$RURAL[EUandNATO2015$STRATUM==3]<-0 
EUandNATO2015$URBAN[EUandNATO2015$STRATUM==1]<-0 
EUandNATO2015$URBAN[EUandNATO2015$STRATUM==2]<-1 
EUandNATO2015$URBAN[EUandNATO2015$STRATUM==3]<-0 
EUandNATO2015$TBS[EUandNATO2015$STRATUM==1]<-0 
EUandNATO2015$TBS[EUandNATO2015$STRATUM==2]<-0 
EUandNATO2015$TBS[EUandNATO2015$STRATUM==3]<-1 
 
# Recode categorical data, 2013 data 
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EUandNATO2013[,2] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,2] == "Male", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,2] == "Female", 0, ''))  
EUandNATO2013[,4] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,4] == "No primary education", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,4] == "Primary education (either complete or incomplete)", 2, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,4] == "Incomplete secondary education", 3, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,4] == "Completed secondary education", 4, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,4] == "Secondary technical education", 5, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,4] == "Incomplete higher education", 6, ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,4] 
== "Completed higher education (BA, MA, or Specialist degree)", 7, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,4] == "Post-graduate degree", 8, '')))))))) 
EUandNATO2013[,5] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,5] == "Rural", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,5] == "Urban", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,5] == "Capital", 3, ''))) 
EUandNATO2013[,6] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,6] == "Don't support at all", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,6] == "Rather not support", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,6] == 
"Equally support and don't support", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,6] == "Rather support", 4, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,6] == "Fully support", 5, ''))))) 
EUandNATO2013[,7] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,7] == "Don't support at all", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,7] == "Rather not support", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,7] == 
"Equally support and don't support", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,7] == "Rather support", 4, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,7] == "Fully support", 5, ''))))) 
EUandNATO2013[,8] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,8] == "Fully distrust", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,8] == "Somewhat distrust", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,8] == 
"Neither trust not distrust", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,8] == "Somewhat trust", 4, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2013[,7] == "Fully trust", 5, ''))))) 
EUandNATO2013$RURAL[EUandNATO2013$STRATUM==1]<-1 
EUandNATO2013$RURAL[EUandNATO2013$STRATUM==2]<-0 
EUandNATO2013$RURAL[EUandNATO2013$STRATUM==3]<-0 
EUandNATO2013$URBAN[EUandNATO2013$STRATUM==1]<-0 
EUandNATO2013$URBAN[EUandNATO2013$STRATUM==2]<-1 
EUandNATO2013$URBAN[EUandNATO2013$STRATUM==3]<-0 
EUandNATO2013$TBS[EUandNATO2013$STRATUM==1]<-0 
EUandNATO2013$TBS[EUandNATO2013$STRATUM==2]<-0 
EUandNATO2013$TBS[EUandNATO2013$STRATUM==3]<-1 
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# Recode categorical data,2012 data 
EUandNATO2012[,2] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,2] == "Male", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,2] == "Female", 0, ''))  
EUandNATO2012[,4] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,4] == "No primary education", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,4] == "Primary education", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,4] == 
"Incomplete secondary education", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,4] == "Completed secondary 
education", 4, ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,4] == "Secondary technical education", 5, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,4] == "Incomplete higher education", 6, ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,4] 
== "Completed higher education", 7, ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,4] == "Post-graduate degree", 8, 
'')))))))) 
EUandNATO2012[,5] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,5] == "Rural", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,5] == "Urban", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,5] == "Capital", 3, ''))) 
EUandNATO2012[,6] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,6] == "1", 1, ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,6] 
== "2", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,6] == "3", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,6] == "4", 4, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,6] == "5", 5, ''))))) 
EUandNATO2012[,7] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,7] == "1", 1, ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,7] 
== "2", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,7] == "3", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,7] == "4", 4, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,7] == "5", 5, ''))))) 
EUandNATO2012[,8] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,8] == "Fully distrust", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,8] == "Somewhat distrust", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,8] == 
"Neither trust nor distrust", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,8] == "Somewhat trust", 4, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2012[,7] == "Fully trust", 5, ''))))) 
EUandNATO2012$RURAL[EUandNATO2012$STRATUM==1]<-1 
EUandNATO2012$RURAL[EUandNATO2012$STRATUM==2]<-0 
EUandNATO2012$RURAL[EUandNATO2012$STRATUM==3]<-0 
EUandNATO2012$URBAN[EUandNATO2012$STRATUM==1]<-0 
EUandNATO2012$URBAN[EUandNATO2012$STRATUM==2]<-1 
EUandNATO2012$URBAN[EUandNATO2012$STRATUM==3]<-0 
EUandNATO2012$TBS[EUandNATO2012$STRATUM==1]<-0 
EUandNATO2012$TBS[EUandNATO2012$STRATUM==2]<-0 
EUandNATO2012$TBS[EUandNATO2012$STRATUM==3]<-1 
 
# Recode categorical data, 2011 data 
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EUandNATO2011[,2] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,2] == "Male", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,2] == "Female", 0, ''))  
EUandNATO2011[,4] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,4] == "No primary education", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,4] == "Primary education", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,4] == 
"Incomplete secondary education", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,4] == "Completed secondary 
education", 4, ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,4] == "Secondary technical education", 5, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,4] == "Incomplete higher education", 6, ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,4] 
== "Completed higher education", 7, ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,4] == "Post-graduate degree", 8, 
'')))))))) 
EUandNATO2011[,5] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,5] == "Rural", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,5] == "Urban", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,5] == "Capital", 3, ''))) 
EUandNATO2011[,6] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,6] == "1", 1, ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,6] 
== "2", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,6] == "3", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,6] == "4", 4, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,6] == "5", 5, ''))))) 
EUandNATO2011[,7] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,7] == "1", 1, ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,7] 
== "2", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,7] == "3", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,7] == "4", 4, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,7] == "5", 5, ''))))) 
EUandNATO2011[,8] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,8] == "1", 1, ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,8] 
== "2", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,8] == "3", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,8] == "4", 4, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2011[,7] == "5", 5, ''))))) 
EUandNATO2011$RURAL[EUandNATO2011$STRATUM==1]<-1 
EUandNATO2011$RURAL[EUandNATO2011$STRATUM==2]<-0 
EUandNATO2011$RURAL[EUandNATO2011$STRATUM==3]<-0 
EUandNATO2011$URBAN[EUandNATO2011$STRATUM==1]<-0 
EUandNATO2011$URBAN[EUandNATO2011$STRATUM==2]<-1 
EUandNATO2011$URBAN[EUandNATO2011$STRATUM==3]<-0 
EUandNATO2011$TBS[EUandNATO2011$STRATUM==1]<-0 
EUandNATO2011$TBS[EUandNATO2011$STRATUM==2]<-0 
EUandNATO2011$TBS[EUandNATO2011$STRATUM==3]<-1 
 
# Recode categorical data, 2010 data 
EUandNATO2010[,2] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,2] == "Male", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,2] == "Female", 0, ''))  
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EUandNATO2010[,4] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,4] == "No primary education", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,4] == "Primary education", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,4] == 
"Incomplete secondary education", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,4] == "Completed secondary 
education", 4, ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,4] == "Secondary technical education", 5, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,4] == "Incomplete higher education", 6, ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,4] 
== "Completed higher education", 7, ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,4] == "Post-graduate degree", 8, 
'')))))))) 
EUandNATO2010[,5] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,5] == "Rural", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,5] == "Urban", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,5] == "Capital", 3, ''))) 
EUandNATO2010[,6] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,6] == "1", 1, ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,6] 
== "2", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,6] == "3", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,6] == "4", 4, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,6] == "5", 5, ''))))) 
EUandNATO2010[,7] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,7] == "1", 1, ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,7] 
== "2", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,7] == "3", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,7] == "4", 4, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2010[,7] == "5", 5, ''))))) 
EUandNATO2010$RURAL[EUandNATO2010$STRATUM==1]<-1 
EUandNATO2010$RURAL[EUandNATO2010$STRATUM==2]<-0 
EUandNATO2010$RURAL[EUandNATO2010$STRATUM==3]<-0 
EUandNATO2010$URBAN[EUandNATO2010$STRATUM==1]<-0 
EUandNATO2010$URBAN[EUandNATO2010$STRATUM==2]<-1 
EUandNATO2010$URBAN[EUandNATO2010$STRATUM==3]<-0 
EUandNATO2010$TBS[EUandNATO2010$STRATUM==1]<-0 
EUandNATO2010$TBS[EUandNATO2010$STRATUM==2]<-0 
EUandNATO2010$TBS[EUandNATO2010$STRATUM==3]<-1 
 
# Recode categorical data, 2009 data 
EUandNATO2009[,2] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,2] == "Male", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,2] == "Female", 0, ''))  
EUandNATO2009[,4] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,4] == "No primary education", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,4] == "Primary education", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,4] == 
"Incomplete secondary education", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,4] == "Completed secondary 
education", 4, ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,4] == "Secondary technical education", 5, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,4] == "Incomplete higher education", 6, ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,4] 
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== "Completed higher education", 7, ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,4] == "Post-graduate degree", 8, 
'')))))))) 
EUandNATO2009[,5] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,5] == "Rural", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,5] == "Urban", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,5] == "Capital", 3, ''))) 
EUandNATO2009[,6] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,6] == "Don't support at all", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,6] == "2", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,6] == "3", 3, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,6] == "4", 4, ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,6] == "Fully support", 5, ''))))) 
EUandNATO2009[,7] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,7] == "Fully distrust", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,7] == "2", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,7] == "3", 3, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,7] == "4", 4, ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,7] == "Fully trust", 5, ''))))) 
EUandNATO2009$RURAL[EUandNATO2009$STRATUM==1]<-1 
EUandNATO2009$RURAL[EUandNATO2009$STRATUM==2]<-0 
EUandNATO2009$RURAL[EUandNATO2009$STRATUM==3]<-0 
EUandNATO2009$URBAN[EUandNATO2009$STRATUM==1]<-0 
EUandNATO2009$URBAN[EUandNATO2009$STRATUM==2]<-1 
EUandNATO2009$URBAN[EUandNATO2009$STRATUM==3]<-0 
EUandNATO2009$TBS[EUandNATO2009$STRATUM==1]<-0 
EUandNATO2009$TBS[EUandNATO2009$STRATUM==2]<-0 
EUandNATO2009$TBS[EUandNATO2009$STRATUM==3]<-1 
 
# Recode categorical data, 2008 data 
EUandNATO2008[,2] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2008[,2] == "Male", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2008[,2] == "Female", 0, ''))  
EUandNATO2008[,5] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2008[,5] == "Rural", 1, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2008[,5] == "Urban", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2008[,5] == "Capital", 3, ''))) 
EUandNATO2008[,6] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2008[,6] == "1", 1, ifelse(EUandNATO2008[,6] 
== "2", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2008[,6] == "3", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2008[,6] == "4", 4, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2008[,6] == "5", 5, ''))))) 
EUandNATO2008[,7] <- ifelse(EUandNATO2008[,7] == "1", 1, ifelse(EUandNATO2009[,7] 
== "2", 2, ifelse(EUandNATO2008[,7] == "3", 3, ifelse(EUandNATO2008[,7] == "4", 4, 
ifelse(EUandNATO2008[,7] == "5", 5, ifelse(EUandNATO2008[,7] == "NA", '', '')))))) 
EUandNATO2008$RURAL[EUandNATO2008$STRATUM==1]<-1 
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EUandNATO2008$RURAL[EUandNATO2008$STRATUM==2]<-0 
EUandNATO2008$RURAL[EUandNATO2008$STRATUM==3]<-0 
EUandNATO2008$URBAN[EUandNATO2008$STRATUM==1]<-0 
EUandNATO2008$URBAN[EUandNATO2008$STRATUM==2]<-1 
EUandNATO2008$URBAN[EUandNATO2008$STRATUM==3]<-0 
EUandNATO2008$TBS[EUandNATO2008$STRATUM==1]<-0 
EUandNATO2008$TBS[EUandNATO2008$STRATUM==2]<-0 
EUandNATO2008$TBS[EUandNATO2008$STRATUM==3]<-1 
 
# View all data sets 
View (EUandNATO2015) 
View (EUandNATO2013) 
View (EUandNATO2012) 
View (EUandNATO2011) 
View (EUandNATO2010) 
View (EUandNATO2009) 
View (EUandNATO2008) 
 
table(EUandNATO2015$NATOSUPP) 
table(EUandNATO2015$EUSUPP) 
table(EUandNATO2015$TRUSTEU) ## Fully trust not coded correctly 
 
table(EUandNATO2013$NATOSUPP) 
table(EUandNATO2013$EUSUPP) 
table(EUandNATO2013$TRUSTEU) ## Fully trust not coded correctly 
 
table(EUandNATO2012$NATOSUPP) 
table(EUandNATO2012$EUSUPP) 
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table(EUandNATO2012$TRUSTEU) ## Fully trust not coded correctly 
 
table(EUandNATO2011$NATOSUPP) 
table(EUandNATO2011$EUSUPP) 
table(EUandNATO2011$TRUSTEU) ## All coded correctly because numbers were coded from 
the start  
 
table(EUandNATO2010$NATOSUPP) 
table(EUandNATO2010$TRUSTEU)  
 
table(EUandNATO2009$NATOSUPP) 
table(EUandNATO2009$TRUSTEU) 
 
table(EUandNATO2008$NATOSUPP) 
table(EUandNATO2008$TRUSTEU) 
 
install.packages("psych") 
library(psych) 
 
# All 2015 data as numeric 
EUandNATO2015$MALE <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2015$MALE) 
EUandNATO2015$AGE <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2015$AGE) 
EUandNATO2015$EDU <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2015$EDU) 
EUandNATO2015$STRATUM <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2015$STRATUM) 
EUandNATO2015$NATOSUPP <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2015$NATOSUPP) 
EUandNATO2015$EUSUPP <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2015$EUSUPP) 
EUandNATO2015$TRUSTEU <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2015$TRUSTEU) 
EUandNATO2015$RURAL <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2015$RURAL) 
EUandNATO2015$URBAN <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2015$URBAN) 
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EUandNATO2015$TBS <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2015$TBS) 
 
# All 2013 data as numberic 
EUandNATO2013$MALE <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2013$MALE) 
EUandNATO2013$AGE <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2013$AGE) 
EUandNATO2013$EDU <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2013$EDU) 
EUandNATO2013$STRATUM <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2013$STRATUM) 
EUandNATO2013$NATOSUPP <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2013$NATOSUPP) 
EUandNATO2013$EUSUPP <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2013$EUSUPP) 
EUandNATO2013$TRUSTEU <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2013$TRUSTEU) 
EUandNATO2013$RURAL <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2013$RURAL) 
EUandNATO2013$URBAN <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2013$URBAN) 
EUandNATO2013$TBS <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2013$TBS) 
 
# All 2012 data as numeric 
EUandNATO2012$MALE <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2012$MALE) 
EUandNATO2012$AGE <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2012$AGE) 
EUandNATO2012$EDU <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2012$EDU) 
EUandNATO2012$STRATUM <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2012$STRATUM) 
EUandNATO2012$NATOSUPP <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2012$NATOSUPP) 
EUandNATO2012$EUSUPP <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2012$EUSUPP) 
EUandNATO2012$TRUSTEU <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2012$TRUSTEU) 
EUandNATO2012$RURAL <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2012$RURAL) 
EUandNATO2012$URBAN <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2012$URBAN) 
EUandNATO2012$TBS <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2012$TBS) 
 
# All 2011 data as numeric 
EUandNATO2011$MALE <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2011$MALE) 
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EUandNATO2011$AGE <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2011$AGE) 
EUandNATO2011$EDU <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2011$EDU) 
EUandNATO2011$STRATUM <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2011$STRATUM) 
EUandNATO2011$NATOSUPP <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2011$NATOSUPP) 
EUandNATO2011$EUSUPP <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2011$EUSUPP) 
EUandNATO2011$TRUSTEU <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2011$TRUSTEU) 
EUandNATO2011$RURAL <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2011$RURAL) 
EUandNATO2011$URBAN <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2011$URBAN) 
EUandNATO2011$TBS <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2011$TBS) 
 
# All 2010 data as numeric 
EUandNATO2010$MALE <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2010$MALE) 
EUandNATO2010$AGE <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2010$AGE) 
EUandNATO2010$EDU <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2010$EDU) 
EUandNATO2010$STRATUM <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2010$STRATUM) 
EUandNATO2010$NATOSUPP <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2010$NATOSUPP) 
EUandNATO2010$TRUSTEU <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2010$TRUSTEU) 
EUandNATO2010$RURAL <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2010$RURAL) 
EUandNATO2010$URBAN <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2010$URBAN) 
EUandNATO2010$TBS <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2010$TBS) 
 
# All 2009 data as numeric 
EUandNATO2009$MALE <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2009$MALE) 
EUandNATO2009$AGE <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2009$AGE) 
EUandNATO2009$EDU <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2009$EDU) 
EUandNATO2009$STRATUM <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2009$STRATUM) 
EUandNATO2009$NATOSUPP <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2009$NATOSUPP) 
EUandNATO2009$TRUSTEU <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2009$TRUSTEU) 
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EUandNATO2009$RURAL <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2009$RURAL) 
EUandNATO2009$URBAN <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2009$URBAN) 
EUandNATO2009$TBS <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2009$TBS) 
 
# All 2008 data as numeric 
EUandNATO2008$MALE <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2008$MALE) 
EUandNATO2008$AGE <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2008$AGE) 
EUandNATO2008$EDU <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2008$EDU) 
EUandNATO2008$STRATUM <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2008$STRATUM) 
EUandNATO2008$NATOSUPP <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2008$NATOSUPP) 
EUandNATO2008$TRUSTEU <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2008$TRUSTEU) 
EUandNATO2008$RURAL <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2008$RURAL) 
EUandNATO2008$URBAN <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2008$URBAN) 
EUandNATO2008$TBS <- as.numeric(EUandNATO2008$TBS) 
 
# Correlation between EDU and TBS 
cor(EUandNATO2015$EDU, EUandNATO2015$TBS, use="complete")  
0.2420515 
cor(EUandNATO2013$EDU, EUandNATO2013$TBS, use="complete")  
0.1943902 
cor(EUandNATO2012$EDU, EUandNATO2012$TBS, use="complete")  
0.2308522 
cor(EUandNATO2011$EDU, EUandNATO2011$TBS, use="complete")  
0.2519321 
cor(EUandNATO2010$EDU, EUandNATO2010$TBS, use="complete")  
0.2146085 
cor(EUandNATO2009$EDU, EUandNATO2009$TBS, use="complete")  
0.3058503 
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cor(EUandNATO2008$EDU, EUandNATO2008$TBS, use="complete")  
0.2089696 
 
# Correlation between EDU and STRATUM 
cor(EUandNATO2015$EDU, EUandNATO2015$STRATUM, use="complete")  
0.2930711 
cor(EUandNATO2013$EDU, EUandNATO2013$STRATUM, use="complete")  
0.2294538 
cor(EUandNATO2012$EDU, EUandNATO2012$STRATUM, use="complete")  
0.2742154 
cor(EUandNATO2011$EDU, EUandNATO2011$STRATUM, use="complete")  
0.3184339 
cor(EUandNATO2010$EDU, EUandNATO2010$STRATUM, use="complete")  
0.2639676 
cor(EUandNATO2009$EDU, EUandNATO2009$STRATUM, use="complete")  
0.3428481 
cor(EUandNATO2008$EDU, EUandNATO2008$STRATUM, use="complete")  
0.2505422 
 
# Regressions for 2015 data 
NATO2015_1 <- lm(NATOSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + RURAL + TBS, 
data=EUandNATO2015) 
EU2015_1 <- lm(EUSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + RURAL + TBS, data=EUandNATO2015) 
stargazer(NATO2015_1, EU2015_1)  
 
NATO2015_2 <- lm(NATOSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + STRATUM, 
data=EUandNATO2015) 
EU2015_2 <- lm(EUSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + STRATUM, data=EUandNATO2015) 
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# Regressions for 2013 data 
NATO2013_1 <- lm(NATOSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + RURAL + TBS, 
data=EUandNATO2013) 
EU2013_1 <- lm(EUSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + RURAL + TBS, data=EUandNATO2013) 
stargazer(NATO2013_1, EU2013_1)  
NATO2013_2 <- lm(NATOSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + STRATUM, 
data=EUandNATO2013) 
EU2013_2 <- lm(EUSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + STRATUM, data=EUandNATO2013) 
 
# Regressions for 2012 data 
NATO2012_1 <- lm(NATOSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + RURAL + TBS, 
data=EUandNATO2012) 
EU2012_1 <- lm(EUSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + RURAL + TBS, data=EUandNATO2012) 
stargazer(NATO2012_1, EU2012_1) 
NATO2012_2 <- lm(NATOSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + STRATUM, 
data=EUandNATO2012) 
EU2012_2 <- lm(EUSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + STRATUM, data=EUandNATO2012) 
 
# Regressions for 2011 data 
NATO2011_1 <- lm(NATOSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + RURAL + TBS, 
data=EUandNATO2011) 
EU2011_1 <- lm(EUSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + RURAL + TBS, data=EUandNATO2011) 
stargazer(NATO2011_1, EU2011_1) 
 
NATO2011_2 <- lm(NATOSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + STRATUM, 
data=EUandNATO2011) 
EU2011_2 <- lm(EUSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + STRATUM, data=EUandNATO2011) 
 
# Regressions for 2010 data 
NATO2010_1 <- lm(NATOSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + RURAL + TBS, 
data=EUandNATO2010) 
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stargazer(NATO2010_1) 
NATO2010_2 <- lm(NATOSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + STRATUM, 
data=EUandNATO2010) 
 
 
# Regressions for 2009 data 
NATO2009_1 <- lm(NATOSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + RURAL + TBS, 
data=EUandNATO2009) 
stargazer(NATO2009_1) 
NATO2009_2 <- lm(NATOSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + STRATUM, 
data=EUandNATO2009) 
 
# Regressions for 2008 data 
NATO2008_1 <- lm(NATOSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + RURAL + TBS, 
data=EUandNATO2008) 
stargazer(NATO2008_1) 
NATO2008_2 <- lm(NATOSUPP ~ MALE + AGE + EDU + STRATUM, 
data=EUandNATO2008) 
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